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INTRODUCTION 
Foreign agents regulations and laws affecting the operation of foreign-funded non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have increased in the last decade. Indeed, since 2012, 98 
laws restricting freedom of association or assembly were adopted around the world (Rutzen, 
2015), and countries like Hungary, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine, have 
implemented or planned to implement laws on foreign agents’ registrations to make the 
operation of foreign-funded organizations more transparent. Several global indices, such as the 
Global Philanthropy Environment Index (IUPUI Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2018), 
Freedom in the World (Freedom House, 2018), State of Civil Society Report (CIVICUS, 2017), and 
comparative studies (Anheier, 2017, Laufer, 2017, Rutzen, 2015) have highlighted shrinking civil 
society and new restrictions on NGOs’ ability to receive foreign funding in both developing and 
developed countries as emerging trends.  
Numerous countries enacted foreign NGO laws to fight against illicit financial flows, 
defined as “money illegally earned, transferred, or used that crosses borders” (The World Bank, 
2017). However, in the course of fighting against money laundering and financing terrorism, 
several developed Western democracies - such as France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States - implemented regulations that directly or indirectly narrowed the operation of 
NGOs (European Parliament, 2017, p. 10-11). Most recently two member states of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - Hungary and Israel – 
enacted much stricter laws to monitor and control the operation of foreign-funded NGOs. The 
Hungarian and Israeli governments each claim that the enactment of foreign agents regulations 
was necessary to increase the transparency of NGOs and protect their country’s national 
security. Both countries stated that the United States’ 1938 Foreign Agents Regulation Act 
(FARA) served as the baseline for their own foreign agents regulations: the Act LXXVI of 2017 on 
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the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad in Hungary, and the 
Transparency Requirements for Parties Supported by Foreign State Entities Law, 5776-2016 in 
Israel. 
Even though foreign agents regulations, and NGO laws in general, are only one part of 
the shrinking space challenge, they are an important indicator for the state of civil society. As 
new, cross-border challenges such as environmental disasters, refugee crises, and money 
laundering have emerged, civil society, and especially cross-border philanthropy, have become 
extremely important actors of the global arena. The United Nations aims to strengthen the 
engagement with civil society and its international role to successfully implement and monitor 
the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (CIVICUS, 2017c). Additionally, the European Union 
developed policy tools to fight against restrictions on civil society because such restrictions “are 
intensifying in non-democratic but also democratic countries” (European Parliament, 2017, p. 
5). As the closing space often targets human right organizations and civil society organizations 
focusing on democracy and accountability, it is time to pay closer attention to this phenomenon 
before democracy and democratic values are threatened across the globe. Last, but not least, 
we need to start a global conversation to enhance civil society and simultaneously find the right 
scale of necessary limitations to protect one of the universal human rights; the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and associations (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 20).  
Thus, proliferation of foreign NGO laws, especially in developed countries, urges 
researchers to better understand the phenomenon and raise awareness among political and 
philanthropic leaders to prevent the further shrinkage of civic space. While Western 
democracies seem to fight for a more enabling philanthropic environment worldwide that 
supports cross-border activities as well, two Western countries, Hungary and Israel enacted 
foreign agents regulations to monitor and control the operation of foreign-funded NGOs. This 
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thesis answers the questions: 1) what are the presumed and real public rationale of Western 
governments that have passed foreign agents regulations and 2) how might the political, 
economic and socio-cultural environments influence the enactment and implementation of such 
regulations.  
To analyze the recently enacted foreign agents regulations in OECD countries, a scan of 
all 35 OECD countries was performed and Hungary and Israel were identified as the OECD 
member states that enacted such regulations in 2017 and 2016, respectively.  
Then, the thesis compares the Hungarian and Israeli political, economic, and socio-
cultural environment using international indices and cross-country comparative studies and 
provides two case studies about the Hungarian and Israeli foreign agents regulations.  
The case studies focus on three main areas: first, they discuss the development of civil 
society in Hungary and Israel to see the significance and roles of NGOs in both countries. Then, 
to better understand the antecedent events and main rationales that led to the enactment of 
foreign agents regulations, government statements and interviews with government officials are 
analyzed. The case studies then analyze the most important parts of each new piece of 
legislation. Finally, the domestic and international criticism against the Hungarian and Israeli 
foreign agents regulations are discussed using local and international press releases. 
Lastly, the two regulations – the Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organizations 
Receiving Support from Abroad in Hungary and the Transparency Requirements for Parties 
Supported by Foreign State Entities Law, 5776-2016 – are compared to each other, using the 
1938 Foreign Agent Registration Act as a model, due to the fact that both governments claimed 
that their laws copied the U.S. regulation. Finally, the study provides recommendations for 
policymakers to be able to balance between the protection of national security and the 
enhancement of civil society in future policy-making processes. 
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The findings show that both Hungary and Israel are economically healthy countries, but 
they have faced external as well as internal challenges, such as the European refugee crisis and 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, respectively. Both governments stated that they aimed to 
increase the transparency of civil society and protect the national interests by enacting foreign 
agent regulations, however, the phrasing and specific regulations of both laws drew 
international criticism for primarily targeting NGOs that openly oppose government programs or 
promote human rights and transparency. Some argue that these regulations have actually 
stigmatized and delegitimized the work of NGOs rather than protected national security. Indeed, 
we can conclude that both the Hungarian and Israeli foreign agents regulations were used to 
further strengthen the power and legitimacy of the current governments.  
Additionally, the thesis also finds that the foreign agents regulations implemented by 
the Hungarian and Israeli governments are much stricter that the United States’ Foreign Agents 
Registration Act. Unlike the U.S. law, the Hungarian and Israeli regulations target NGOs and do 
not take into consideration whether such NGOs act as agents of foreign principal as a 
consequence of receiving foreign funding. Therefore, we can conclude that the new regulations 
serve more as a political tool to strengthen the governments’ nationalistic ideology and power 
than as a measure to increase transparency in the nonprofit sector. As a consequence, the 
spread of foreign agents regulations could be an indicator not only for the shrinking space of 
civil society, but also for a threat against Western democracies that seem to be more fragile 
than expected. 
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CHAPTER ONE: HAVING A CLEAR PERSPECTIVE – THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND AREAS OF 
RESEARCH FOCUS 
Numerous researchers have studied the supportive political, economic, and social roles 
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in liberal democracies and in countries in transition 
(Diamond, 1994; Dodge and Ospina, 2016; Edwards, 2014) as well as the recent trends of 
shrinking civic space (Anheier, 2017; CIVICUS, 2016; Dupuy et al., 2016; Rutzen, 2015; 
International Center of Non-for-Profit Law, 2016). However, very few articles have analyzed the 
appearance of restrictive NGO laws in developed countries, such as Hungary, Spain, and the 
United States. In order to analyze the legislation targeting foreign-funded NGOs in member 
states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, it is important to 
understand the main concepts and theories related to the current research.  
 Section 1.1 defines the terms of nongovernmental organizations and civil society 
organizations. While these terms are used interchangeably, the thesis will use the former term 
due to the association between NGOs and foreign funding, since the Hungarian and Israeli 
regulations primarily target foreign-funded organizations and do not necessarily address other 
formal or informal institutions operating in the civic space. Section 1.2 briefly discusses the roles 
and development of NGOs to better understand the functions of the organizations targeted by 
anti-foreign NGO regulations.  
Section 1.3 focuses on one of the main trends of the philanthropic sector 
internationally, which is the shrinking space for NGOs. As several reports and studies recently 
stated (Rutzen, 2015; Wilson, 2016; Dupuy et al., 2016; European Foundation Centre, 2016; 
Anheier, 2017; European Parliament, 2017), several governments challenged both the enabling 
political environment for and the freedom of associations. Indeed, 64 restrictive laws, 
regulations, and other initiatives were introduced around the world since 2015 (International 
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Center of Non-for-Profit Law, 2016) and more than 20 countries have implemented anti-foreign 
NGO laws targeting NGOs that receive international financial resources. Both developing and 
developed countries announced such legislation. Most recently two European Union member 
states, Austria and Hungary, limited the freedom of foreign-funded NGOs, and Slovakia might 
implement similar legislation in the future.  
Section 1.4 explores how and why governments and other actors on the global stage 
often see the roles and values of foreign-funded, international NGOs differently. The section 
focuses on why governments feel the need to regulate the operation of foreign-funded NGOs 
and highlights some of the concerns of foreign-funded NGOs including their legitimacy and lack 
of accountability. 
Section 1.5 focuses on countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, the geographic area of the current research. It analyzes the main 
characteristics of the cooperation and highlights that four of the member states have direct 
legislation on foreign-funded NGOs, or a subgroup of such organizations in the case of Austria. 
Simultaneously, several countries, including France, Spain and the United Kingdom, have 
introduced anti-money laundering laws that restrict the free operation of NGOs. Thus, we can 
infer that the shrinking space for NGOs is a relevant issue for developed, high-income countries 
as well. Finally, section 1.6 briefly discusses the main characteristics of two different types of 
legislation that affect international funding of NGOs: the international standards related to the 
fight against anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism; and foreign agent 
laws. 
1.1. Nongovernmental organizations vs. civil society organizations 
The nonprofit literature uses a vast array of terms for organizations operating in civil 
society, such as civil society organizations (CSOs), charity organizations, nonprofit organizations, 
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nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and philanthropic organizations.  The different terms 
focus on these organizations’ different aspects, such as legal, economical, functional, or 
structural, and the terms used in scholarship and practice also differ depending on the 
geographic area. Anheier (2014) argues that the terms, therefore, cannot capture the entirety of 
these organizations. Salamon (2002, p.4) states that the common denominator of these 
organizations is that they are “dedicated to mobilizing private initiative for the common good.” 
NGOs are institutionalized, self-governing, non-compulsory organizations that are independent 
from the government and do not distribute their profit if they generate any (United Nations, 
2003). These organizations are highly professionalized - officially established, run by employed 
staff, well-supported, relatively large, and well-resourced - and promote social and economic 
development (Mercer, 2002, Anheier, 2015) while serving as important political actors in 
democratization as pillars of civil society (Bratton, 1998), especially in developing countries 
(Dupuy et al., 2016). 
Another term used by this study is civil society organizations. Anheier (2015) describes 
CSOs as organizations that emphasize the voluntary associations of citizens and operate outside 
of both the public and business sector. Several researchers, such as Habermas’ (1991), Gellner’s 
(1994), Hadenius and Uggla’ (1996) or Keane’s (2009) defines CSO as involuntary, self-organized 
institutions, operating independently from the state while offering public space for interaction. 
Even though the definition and roles of CSOs are similar to NGOs, CSOs often refer to domestic 
organizations with a primary focus on social service provision, especially in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe where these organizations played a key role in rebuilding the public space 
outside of the autocratic government in the 1980s and 1990s. Carothers (1999) strictly 
differentiates between the roles of civil society and NGOs, underlining that NGOs are only a 
narrow subsector of civil society.  
8 
In the current international arena the term “NGOs” is often given a negative 
connotation by governments that use the term to refer to organizations that receive substantial 
funds from abroad and whose main activities are advocacy for and promotion of human rights, 
transparency, and other liberal values. As following chapters of this study shows, governments 
have used both terms to be able to distinguish foreign-funded CSOs (referred to as NGOs) from 
other CSOs, even if differences between these two types of organizations did not exist before 
the implementation of anti-foreign NGO regulations.  
The thesis uses the terms NGOs and CSOs interchangeably to mean institutionalized, 
self-governing, non-compulsory, not-for-profit organizations that are independent from the 
government. The term NGOs primarily emphasizes those organizations that are attacked by anti-
foreign NGO regulations. The general attributes of the organizations targeted by such legislation 
are the following: these organizations are not related to the government, but they are 
important policy actors; their activities include advocating for human rights, government 
transparency, and liberal values; and they receive substantial amount of charitable contributions 
from abroad.  
1.2. The development of NGOs and their roles in democracy 
Civil society and NGOs are important actors to support opposition to government and 
the democratization of countries across the world (Diamond, 1994; Dodge and Ospina, 2016; 
Edwards, 2014; Newton 2001). NGOs are able to pluralize both the domestic and international 
political arena by representing different interest groups in an institutional setting (Silliman and 
Nable, 1998), to widen and deepen the possibilities of citizen participation by supporting 
marginalized groups to engage with the government and creating relational and framing 
practices for individuals (Fisher, 1998, Dodge and Ospina, 2016), to serve as free schools of 
democracy by inspiring individuals to democratically express their interests and ideas and 
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recruiting and training future political leaders (Diamond, 1994); and to check the state power 
and enhance transparency by challenging its autonomy and developing alternative policies as 
well as disseminating information (Diamond, 1994, Diamond et al., 1995, Fisher, 1998, Anheier, 
2017 ).  
Despite the supporting role in democratization, NGOs can also weaken liberal 
democracies and civil society in general. Authoritarian regimes often use NGOs in order to 
maintain their own power. Governments that highly regulate and monitor the operation of 
NGOs can use these organizations as instruments of the state’s social control and the so-called 
political liberalization only serves as part of the autocracy’s survival strategy (Wiktorowicz, 
2000). Government-related NGOs can legitimate authoritarian regimes by creating a relatively 
liberal political climate and answering Western governments’ demand for creating a pluralized 
civil society, even though these NGOs are highly monitored by the government (Albrecht, 2015). 
Brumberg (2003) argues that liberalized autocracies often promote the growth of NGOs but only 
those that provide social services to the society that can further strengthen the legitimacy and 
power of the government itself. Additionally, government-related NGOs allow the government 
to monitor collective actions that discourage political participation and anti-government 
protests in general. 
CSOs and NGOs are “the most rapidly growing organizational domain in the world” (Hall, 
2016, p. 3). International NGOs show unprecedented growth: the total international NGO 
membership grew 78% between 1990 and 2010; 426% in Central and Eastern Europe and 77% in 
the Middle East and North Africa during throughout the same time period (Anheier, 2014, p. 
463). According to the Union of International Associations (2017), there are more than 75,500 
international NGOs even though we can infer that the growth of international NGOs became 
slower in the 21st century. International NGOs recently have shown a trend of repoliticization, 
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focusing on democracy and social justice (Anheier, 2014). In particular, foreign-funded NGOs 
have gained place in the political arena, and these organizations have been the focus of intense 
controversy as both the public and legislators try to better understand and regulate such 
organizations’ operation and accountability. 
NGOs’ roles in mobilizing opposition, supporting multi-player elections, establishing new 
forms of accountability and transparency and advocating for public interest causes including 
human rights and anticorruption have been well-observed in countries in Africa, Eastern-Europe, 
and Latin-America, as well as in the international arena (Edwards, 2014, Carothers, 1999). While 
developed, democratic countries could support the development of NGOs because of shared 
values and common goals, member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, such as Hungary, Israel, Mexico, or Turkey1, have viewed NGOs as a potential 
threat and started to monitor and oppress these organizations.  
NGOs in liberal democracies are usually not related to the government, but they are 
important policy actors: their activities include advocating for human rights, government 
transparency, and liberal values, and they receive substantial amount of charitable contributions 
from abroad. Thus, governments might see any NGO advocacy as a political threat in the given 
political environment, and the fact that many of these organizations receive foreign funding 
empowers these governments to argue for the necessity of regulations similar to the United 
States’ 1938 Foreign Agents Registrations Act. 
1.3. Shrinking civil society, a global phenomenon 
In 2016, CIVICUS identified 93 countries that violated the freedom of associations, 
including the introduction of restrictive NGO regulations or laws. Dupuy and her colleagues 
                                                            
1 According to CIVICUS’ Monitor (2017) civic space in Mexico and Turkey is repressed, while in Hungary 
and Israel is obstructed. All of these countries are members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.  
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(2016) analyzed resource-scarce developing countries between 1993 and 2012, finding that the 
number of restrictive NGO finance laws in low and middle-income countries was on the rise. 
Indeed, more than 25 developing countries adopted new regulations to restrict locally operating 
NGOs from receiving cross-border donations or grants in the examined time period. Since 2007, 
more than 20 countries, including both low- and high-income countries, announced foreign NGO 
laws in order to regulate, monitor, or restrict the operation of foreign-funded NGOs (See Table 
One based on the Civic Freedom Monitor provided by the International Center of Not-for Profit 
Law, 2017). In the last decade high-income countries, such as Israel and Hungary, enacted 
restrictive foreign NGO laws, therefore the trend of monitoring and restricting NGOs to receive 
cross-border resources appeared in developed countries as well. We can infer that the trend of 
enacting restrictive NGO regulations has accelerated as the analysis conducted by the 
International Center of Not-for-Profit Law (2016) shows that 64 restrictive laws, regulations, and 
other initiatives were introduced around the world since 2015.  
Even though statistics and quantitative data cannot provide recommendations, they can 
show that the implementation of restrictive foreign NGO laws have become a global trend and, 
therefore, it needs to be part of the international political and research agenda. “While the 
statistics are indeed worrying and useful in attracting interest to the problem, such figures are 
less helpful in designing strategies to address it” (Martinez and Dobichina 2016 in European 
Foundation Center, 2016). Martinez and Dobichina argue that statistics quantify and group 
countries with different level of restrictions from Ethiopia, where most foreign-funded NGOs are 
criminalized, to Spain, where questionable anti-money laundering laws have targeted NGOs 
through burdensome bureaucracy. Even though this thesis focuses on cases in which where one 
particular tool, the foreign agents legislation or similar regulation was implemented, it is 
important to see that governments across the world, including ones of developed countries, 
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have continued implementing a range of new restrictive NGO laws. Again, the implementation 
of restrictive NGO laws became a global trend as more than one hundred countries introduced 
such legislation (European Parliament, 2017), and more than 60 restrictive laws, regulations and 
other initiatives were introduced in the last 2 years (International Center of Not-for-Profit Law, 
2016). Thus, it is important to first briefly summarize the global trends.  
Restrictive NGO laws show different characteristics in different countries. In countries 
such as China, Hungary, and Ukraine, these laws often target only a subgroup of NGOs, such as 
human rights organizations or foreign-funded organizations. In other countries, including 
Angola, Egypt, India, Russia, and Turkey, these laws oppress civil society in general. We can infer 
that the state – civil society relations have weakened recently all over the world. Even though 
regulations are needed to control the borders between the state, NGOs, and corporations 
(Simon, et al., 2006), in several cases the legislative body went a step further and not only 
regulated, but restricted, the operation of NGOs.  
The public rationale for restricting civil space as well as the free operation of NGOs 
varies across countries (Rutzen, 2015). Some of them, such as Spain and Mexico, use the 
argument of combating money-laundering and terrorism financing. Others, such as China, might 
prefer international sources to send their donations and financial aid through governmental 
channels to monitor and sometimes use these resources according to the government’s own 
needs. Another reason, according to countries such as Egypt, could be to oppress NGOs, which 
focus on controversial political and human rights issues that might weaken the current regimes’ 
status quo. These arguments show that not only foreign-funded NGOs, but also local, grass-
roots organizations are threatened in numerous countries. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that a governments’ reasons expressed in their public communication might differ from 
the public rationale for oppressing certain types of organizations.
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It is also important to acknowledge that some of the new restrictions in the civil space 
are linked to the types of challenges governments face in the 21st century, especially with regard 
to cross-border giving. Several risks that threaten national security – such as the flow of 
refugees around the world, the political and economic instability in the Middle East and in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the increasing number of terrorist and cyber-attacks, and money-laundering 
among others – have made governments to regulate fields that have not been regulated before. 
It is a challenge to control CSOs to protect national security and promote an enabling 
environment for civil society at the same time, however, the potential of overregulation can 
weaken the sector and undermine the roles and responsibilities of CSOs to address both local 
and global issues (Anheier et al., 2018).  
One of the new fields strictly regulated by governments is cross-border financial flows, 
including international charitable donations. Rutzen (2015) identifies ten different types of 
restrictions related to NGOs’ international funding observed over 2004 to 2015 through almost 
100 restrictive initiatives , such as:  
- prior government approval;  
- stigmatization of international funding through foreign agents legislation;  
- caps on the amount of international funding;  
- mandatory routing of international donations through government-controlled channels or 
agencies; 
- burdensome reporting requirements for foreign-funded NGOs;  
- restrictions on activities supported by foreign funding;  
- restriction on funding sent by certain countries or donors;  
- taxation of international funding;  
- counterterrorism and anti-money laundering; and  
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- other laws that target foreign funding. 
We can conclude that a variety of tools are available for governments to restrict foreign-
funded NGOs from bureaucracy through taxation to stigmatization. Unfortunately, 
stigmatization and negative government statements might undermine the public trust towards 
not only foreign-funded NGOs, but also towards the sector in general. 
Cross-border giving as well as foreign aid are important sources for locally-operating 
NGOs, even in several developed countries. Both in Hungary and Israel, numerous human rights 
organizations – as well as other CSOs focusing on social services, child and homeless care – 
receive funding from foreign individuals and organizations. Dupuy and her colleagues (2016) 
mention that governments worry about their authority and power, which might be influenced 
and challenged by foreign-funded NGOs. Therefore, “governments prioritize political survival 
over aid, international reputations, and norm compliance … when they perceive serious threats 
to their rule” (Dupuy et al., 2016, p. 2). Wilson (2016) focuses on human rights-related NGOs 
and states that the rising number of restrictive NGO regulations pertaining to international 
funding was initiated by the global counterterrorism efforts after the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States. In several cases restrictive NGO regulations were adopted in response to directives from 
international organizations to implement anti-money laundering standards. Recently, laws 
attacking primarily foreign-funded NGOs have been also enacted worldwide. According to the 
governments of nations that implemented such regulations, the reasons behind these laws vary 
from the fight against the financing of terrorism (Russia and Malaysia), money laundering 
(Hungary and Jordan), and national self-determination (Venezuela). 
Several countries have announced legislation on cross-border donations and foreign-
funded NGOs, most recently two European Union member states. Austria restricted incoming 
cross-border donations by adopting the 2015 Federal Law on the External Legal Relationships of 
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Islamic Religious Societies that prohibits foreign funding for Austrian mosques and Islamic 
societies (Schmid, 2015). Hungary recently adopted the 2017 Law on the Transparency of 
Organizations Receiving Foreign Funds that forces NGOs receiving more than USD 26,930 a year 
in international donations to register as a “foreign-supported organization” and use this term in 
every publication related to their organization. Several governments, international 
organizations, and the European Union raised their voice against these laws. Indeed, the 
European Commission, the executive of the European Union (European Commission, 2017a), 
initiated legal proceedings against Hungary asserting that Hungary’s anti-foreign NGO Law 
violates the right of freedom of association and the protection of private life and personal data 
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as breaching the 
principle of free movement of capital within the European Union by indirectly discriminating and 
disproportionately restricting donations from abroad (European Commission, 2017b). At this 
time, nor Austria neither Hungary have initiated any changes in their NGO legislation. 
The number of media attacks against NGOs have also been increasing. Not only in 
developing countries, but in countries like Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and the 
United Kingdom, scandals and media attacks against NGOs have negatively affected the 
philanthropic environment in general. Although NGOs are still the most trusted institutions 
according to the 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer, the general population’s trust towards NGOs, 
as well as businesses, government, and the media is “in crisis” after declining broadly in 2016 
(Edelman, 2017). The Edelman Trust Barometer found that from 2016 to 2017 public trust 
towards NGOs has decreased in 21 out of the 28 countries where the surveys were conducted, 
and in 8 countries NGOs became distrusted, including Russia, Sweden, Japan, Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Poland (Edelman, 2017, p.14). Thus, it is 
understandable, and at the same time challenging, that one of the current concerns for 
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European NGOs is to gain and maintain public trust (European Fundraising Association, 2015, p. 
15). 
1.4. Foreign-funded NGOs, as unknown factors in the equation 
Governments and other actors on the global stage often see the roles and values of 
foreign-funded, international NGOs differently. NGOs are often seen as “formal organizations 
outside the government and for profit sectors, advocating specific policies and/or providing 
services” (Dupuy et al., 2016, p. 299) and are considered crucial to the enhancement of 
democracy (Hadenius and Uggla, 2016). However, NGOs have received criticisms, including 
prioritizing donor preference instead of the real need of citizens they serve (Carapico, 2012), 
being bureaucratic and business-like rather than diverse and innovative as traditional grassroots 
initiatives (Anheier, 2014), and undermining governments’ sovereignty by representing a global 
agenda developed by a small group of donors (Dupuy et al., 2016). The thesis hypothesizes that 
foreign-funded NGOs are important actors in addressing global challenges and enhancing 
democracies. However, it is important to acknowledge that such organizations’ roles and 
responsibilities are widely debated among policymakers and researchers. The lack of 
professional guidelines or a universal “bill of rights” for NGOs can undermine the legitimacy and 
credibility of foreign-funded NGOs in their country of operations. Different parties such as 
practitioners, donors, policy makers, and researchers need to address these questions and find 
joint solutions in order to improve the accountability and legitimacy of these organizations and 
strengthen the public trust towards cross-border philanthropy.  
Foreign-funded NGOs that are targeted by regulations for cross-border financial flows 
are often human rights and advocacy organizations. While their work is crucial to enhance 
human rights and democratic values, the lack of accountability to the general public as well as 
their legitimacy raises some real questions. (Mercer 2002, Anheier, 2014, Winters, 2010). While 
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such organizations have an influential role in the political arena due to their resources and 
international policymaking circles, such organizations, as both the Hungarian and Israeli 
governments have argued, are not elected by the country’s citizens and, therefore, their 
beneficiaries have no direct way to hold these orgs accountable.  
Besides their legitimacy, countries have increasingly focused on issues of security. After 
the terror attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, money laundering and terrorist financing 
became the center of international financial regulations. Several intragovernmental 
organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, suggested improving the regulations of 
NGOs and cross-border financial flows, as terrorist groups had been exploiting the civil sector to 
“raise and move funds, provide logistical support, [and] encourage terrorist recruitment” 
(Financial Action Task Force, 2010, p.20). Thus, several governments implemented new 
regulations in order to protect their security. Indeed, as “border policing” is a “symbolic 
representation of state authority” (Andreas, 2000, p. 8), the regulation of cross-border financial 
flows – including charitable donations – seems to be a logical step from governments.  
Additionally, as numerous foreign-funded NGOs address topics of an arguably political 
nature, such as minority rights and government accountability, governments often feel 
threatened by these organizations. Therefore, governments often regulate foreign-funded NGOs 
after re-election, as they “feel they have gained room and legitimacy for political maneuver” 
(Dupuy et al., 2016, p. 303) to fulfill the desire of their citizens. Several countries, such as 
Ethiopia, Israel, Hungary, or Russia, re-elected governments that had targeted foreign-funded 
NGOs to promote accountability and protect national security and sovereignty. 
Finally, the accountability of foreign-funded NGOs also raises several questions. As the 
“chain of accountability relationships in an international development program can be long and 
complex” (Winters, 2010, p. 220), the accountability relationships among the stakeholders of 
20 
foreign-funded NGOs is long and complex. The plurality of stakeholders requires multiple 
dimensions of accountability (Anheier, 2014, p. 421): upwards (funders and supporters), 
downwards (members and beneficiaries), externally (government, media, and society as a 
whole), and internally (staff and volunteers). However, as foreign-funded NGOs often depend on 
limited number of funders, and relatively scarce funding, these organizations often prioritize the 
requirements of their funders. That could increase bureaucracy by switching the focus to 
reporting requirements instead of service provision. These organizations also display an 
isomorphic tendency as they imitate each other and try to follow global guidelines to work more 
effectively, which could in turn jeopardize the values and interests of host communities. 
We can conclude that there are several arguments where governments feel the need to 
regulate the operation of foreign-funded NGOs. Even though it is not part of this study’s 
research focus, it is crucial to acknowledge the numerous reasons for stricter regulations. 
However, it is important to find a balance between protecting national security, enhancing 
philanthropy, and promoting accountability, because restrictive regulations on cross-border 
financial flows and foreign-funded NGOs can be harmful for CSOs and civil society as a whole.  
1.5. OECD countries under the microscope 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an 
intergovernmental organization with 35 member states, established in 1960 by 18 European 
countries, Canada, and the United States to encourage economic development and promote 
policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world (OECD, 
2017a). Member states are committed to a market economy and a pluralistic democracy (OECD, 
2008, p. 8). Currently, OECD identifies the following four areas of interest (OECD, 2017b): 
 
- Restore confidence in markets and the institutions that make them 
function;  
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- Re-establish healthy public finances as a basis for future sustainable 
economic growth; 
- Foster and support new sources of growth through innovation, 
environmentally friendly ‘green growth’ strategies and the development of 
emerging economies; and 
- Ensure that people of all ages can develop the skills to work productively 
and satisfyingly in the jobs of tomorrow. 
 
Most OECD member states are high-income, developed countries with very high levels of human 
development (Table Two). Two exceptions are Mexico and Turkey that are upper middle income 
countries with high levels of human development. These two countries are outliers in other 
parameters as well, including the level of gross domestic product per capita as well as the 
freedom of their civil society. 
As the number of NGOs has been growing worldwide, the grants by private agencies and 
NGOs has also increased. The total amount of grants by NGOs operating in OECD Development 
Assistance Committee’s member states reached USD 39,890 million in 2016 (using 2014 as a 
base year) following a continuous increase from 2014 (OECD, 2018). This indicator shows that 
the amount of private international financial sources has been increasing and development 
funding from the private sector has become significant in the international arena. Thus, cross-
border private philanthropy is becoming more significant and leads to an increasing level of 
foreign charitable contributions across the world.  
Even though the OECD economically seems to be a homogenous group of member 
states, there is significant heterogeneity among these countries in terms of civic space. CIVICUS 
has conducted the CIVICUS Monitor – Tracking Civic Space (2017a), a worldwide analysis on civic 
space. CIVICUS defines civic space as “the set of conditions that allow civil society and 
individuals to organize, participate and communicate freely and without discrimination, and in 
doing so, influence the political and social structures around them” (CIVICUS, 2017b). Even 
though this index does not focus solely on the freedom of associations and the free operation of 
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NGOs, it is a useful starting point to examine the OECD countries’ civic space. CIVICUS rates the 
state of civic space in every country of the world in a five-scale system: open, narrowed,  
Table Two: Foreign-funded NGO Laws around The World 
Country Foreign-funded NGO Regulations Year of 
implementation 
Brief Summary 
Azerbaijan Registration Law (2014);                                                                                     
Rules on Studying the Activities of 
Non-Governmental Organizations, 
Branches or Representative Offices 
of Foreign Non-Governmental 
Organizations (2015); 
Rules on obtaining the right to 
provide grants in the territory of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan by 
foreign donors (2015);                                                                   
Rules on registration of service 
contracts on provision of services 
or implementation of work by 
NGOs, as well as by branches or 
representations of foreign NGOs 
from foreign sources (2015); and                                                                          
Decree on Simplification of 
Registration of Foreign Grants in 
Azerbaijan (2016)  
2014; 2015; 2016 In Azerbaijan, several new regulations 
and amendments affect the operation 
of foreign-funded NGOs such as legal 
representatives of foreign-funded 
NGOs must have a permanent 
residence in the country; foreign-
funded NGOs need to acquire am 
agreement with the Ministry of Justice 
that must include a specific expiration 
day, foreign donors need to obtain 
prior government approval to provide 
grants to CSOs or NGOs in the country, 
and operation of unregistered foreign-
funded NGOs are prohibited. 
Bangladesh Foreign Donations (Voluntary 
Activities) Regulation Act (2016) 
2016 The Bangladeshi government 
established the NGO Affairs Bureau 
within the Ministry of Establishment 
to regulate and monitor the activities 
of foreign-funded NGOs. Foreign-
funded NGOs need to obtain prior 
governmental approval, known as the 
FD Registration, from the Bureau. 
Additional approval for all projects is 
also required. The Bureau can 
withdraw the approval any time in 
case of the use of “malicious” or 
“derogatory” statements against the 
constitution and constitutional bodies 
of Bangladesh.  
Belarus Decree No. 5 of the President of 
the Republic of Belarus on Foreign 
Gratuitous Aid (2015) 
2016 Decree No. 5 introduced several 
requirements that have negatively 
affected the operation of foreign-
funded NGOs including vague 
terminology to ban the use of foreign 
donations in cases of extremist 
activities, political campaigns, and 
"other political propaganda work with 
the population."  
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China Charity Law (2016);                                               
Law on the Management of 
Overseas NGOs’ Activities in 
Mainland China (2016) 
2016; 2017 The Charity Law requires foreign 
funding to be under surveillance by 
police and national security 
departments. The n the Management 
of Overseas NGOs’ Activities in 
Mainland China requires CSOs to 
report international contacts to 
authorities and to seek approval for 
visits, international cooperation, as 
well as foreign donations. Foreign 
NGOs are required for office 
registration or filing of temporary 
activities.  
Colombia Law 1819 of 2016 2016 The law addresses tax issues and 
requires CSOs to register in the 
President's Agency of Cooperation. 
Those CSOs that are eligible for tax 
incentives must also disclose the 
information regarding their foreign 
donations.  
Egypt Law 70 of 2017 on Associations and 
Other Foundations Working in the 
Field of Civil Work 
2017 The new law requires all CSOs and 
foreign-funded NGOs to register with 
the Ministry of Social Solidarity and 
informal or unregistered groups 
became prohibited. The law also 
imposes registration fees on foreign-
funded NGOs seeking to operate in 
the country and introduces a 
regulatory committee to monitor both 
domestic and foreign donations.  
Ethiopia Proclamation to Provide for the 
Registration and Regulation of 
Charities and Societies (2009) 
2009 To be considered an Ethiopian Charity 
or Society, a CSO may not receive 
more than 10% of its overall resources 
from foreign sources in order to 
engage in activities that advance 
human and democratic rights, 
promote the equality of nations and 
nationalities and peoples and that of 
gender and religion, promote the 
rights of disabled and children’s rights, 
promote conflict resolution or 
reconciliation, and promote the 
efficiency of the justice and law 
enforcement services.  
Hungary Act LXXVI of 2017 on the 
Transparency of Organizations 
Receiving Support from Abroad 
2017 The act requires foreign-funded NGOs 
to disclose their status of 
“organization supported from abroad” 
on their online and printed materials 
and declare the information of their 
major sponsors whom donation is HUF 
500,000 (US$ 2,000) or more. The 
violation of the law may lead to 
involuntary dissolution of the NGO.  
India Foreign Contribution Regulation 
Act (2010, amended in 2015);                                   
Financial Bill (2017) 
2017 Foreign-funded NGOs registered 
under the Foreign Contribution 
Regulation Act are required to have 
their accounts in either nationalized 
banks or in banks with capacity to 
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provide core banking services that 
allows government security agencies 
to access the accounts of foreign-
funded NGOs in real time. The act also 
requires foreign-funded NGOs report 
the amount of their foreign 
contribution, its source, the manner in 
which it was received, the purpose for 
which it was intended, and the 
manner in which it was used. The new 
Financial Bill prohibits CSOs from 
transferring funds to another CSO by 
way of corpus or a capital grant, and 
restricts cash giving to no more that 
INR 2,000,000 (USD 3,000) per person 
per event per day.  
Indonesia Government Regulation No. 2 of 
2013 on the Amendment of 
Government Regulation No. 63 of 
2008 on the Implementation of 
Law on Foundations 
2013 The government regulation requires 
foreign-funded NGOs to obtain a 
permit issued by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs or the local government 
according to the level of their 
operation. Prior to the permit, foreign-
funded NGOs must sign a written 
agreement with the Indonesian 
government regarding its scope of 
activities.  
Israel Transparency Requirements for 
Parties Supported by Foreign State 
Entities Law, 5776-2016 
2016 The law requires burdensome 
reporting requirements from foreign-
funded NGOs that receive more than 
half of their funding from foreign 
states – including the European Union 
as well. Such foreign-funded NGOs 
must also disclose their status of 
"organizations supported by foreign 
government entities" in official reports 
as well as their online and printed 
materials.  
Jordan Amendments on 2008 Law No. 51 
on Societies issued by the Council 
of Ministers (2015) 
2015 The amendments require CSOs to 
submit an extensive application form 
providing detailed information about 
the source and use of foreign funding 
in order to be able to receive 
donations from abroad.  
Kazakhstan Order No. 553 of the Ministry of 
Finance on Approval of the Rules, 
Form and Terms for Individuals and 
Legal Entities and (or) Structural 
Subdivisions of a Legal Entity to 
Submit Notification to the State 
Income Authorities about the 
Receipt of Funds and (or) other 
Assets from Foreign States, 
International and Foreign 
Organizations, Foreigners, and 
Stateless Persons  
2016 The new legislation requires foreign-
funded NGOs to submit burdensome 
documentation on the receipt and 
expenditure of foreign funds and/or 
assets, and disclose their status as 
"funded from foreign sources" in all 
publications produced with support 
from foreign donations. The legislation 
also introduces administrative and 
criminal penalties in case of non-
compliance. 
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Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Draft Law on Foreign Agents (2014) It was rejected in 
2016 
The draft law targeted foreign-funded 
NGOs and would have required such 
organizations to disclose their status 
as "foreign agents" and prohibited 
them from "political activities."  
Nigeria Draft Bill to Regulate the 
Acceptance and Utilization of 
Financial/Material Contributions of 
Donor Agencies to Voluntary 
Organizations (2014) 
It has not been 
enacted yet. 
The bill imposes a number of 
restrictions on the ability of CSOs to 
receive foreign funding, such as 
mandatory registration to accept 
foreign funding and governmental 
approval prior to receiving foreign 
donations.  
Pakistan International Non-Governmental 
Organization (INGO) Policy (2015) 
2015 The policy requires all INGOs working 
in Pakistan to apply for registration 
with the Ministry of Interior and to 
provide information about their 
sources of funding and how they 
utilize their funds.  
Russia Federal Law Introducing 
Amendments to Certain Legislative 
Acts of the Russian Federation 
Regarding the Regulation of 
Activities of Non-commercial 
Organizations Performing the 
Function of Foreign Agents (2012) 
2012 The law requires all non-commercial 
organizations to register with the 
Ministry of Justice, prior to receive 
foreign-funding if they intend to 
conduct political activities. Such NCOs 
are called "NCOs carrying functions of 
a foreign agent". Since 2014, the 
Ministry of Justice has been 
authorized to register NCOs as 
"foreign agents" without their consent 
and to impose fines in case of non-
compliance. Additionally, foreign-
funded NGOs wishing to make tax-
exempt grants to Russian citizens or 
NCOs must be on a list of 
organizations approved by the Russian 
Government.  
Saudi Arabia Law on Associations and 
Foundations, Royal Decree No. 
M/8, 19.2.1437H (2015) 
2015 The law prohibits CSOs from receiving 
foreign funding unless they obtain an 
approval from the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Development. 
Slovakia Draft Amendment to the Law on 
Non-profit Organizations Providing 
Public Community Services (Law 
No. 213/1997 Coll.) (2016) 
It was rejected in 
2016. 
The amendment proposed to 
introduce the term "foreign agent" 
labelling foreign-funded NGOs that 
"act on order, request, under 
influence or control of a foreign 
natural and legal person" and are 
"funded by a foreign agent." It also 
proposed a creation of a registry of 
foreign agents and would have 
required such organizations to 
disclose their status as "Attention! 
Foreign agent" during their activities 
and in all their information materials.  
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Sudan Policy regarding the Voluntary and 
Humanitarian Work Act 
2013 The policy issued by the Humanitarian 
Aid Commission (HAC) reinforces the 
rules of the Voluntary and 
Humanitarian Work Act, 2006. The 
policy requires CSOs to secure HAC 
approval for projects and individual 
activities before receiving foreign 
funding. The receipt of foreign funding 
without prior approval may lead to the 
CSO's involuntary dissolution.  
Uzbekistan Law on Introduction of 
Amendments to Some Legislative 
Acts, which introduced 
amendments to the Law on Non-
Governmental Non-Commercial 
Organizations (2016);                                                              
Regulation on the Procedure of 
Coordination of Receipt of 
Monetary and Other Assets by 
Non-governmental Non-
commercial Organizations (NNOs) 
When Such Assets are Received 
from Foreign States, International 
and Foreign Organizations, Citizens 
of Foreign States, or From Other 
Persons, Authorized by the 
Mentioned Above Persons (2016) 
2016 In general, the process of receiving 
foreign funding is burdensome in 
Uzbekistan.  In order to receive a 
foreign grant, a CSO must receive a 
special conclusion from the 
Commission under the Cabinet of 
Ministers. The grant funding must be 
sent through a state-owned bank and 
after receiving the grant funding, the 
CSO must provide several reports to a 
special government body operating 
under the Ministry of Finance.  In 
2016, new regulations affected the 
work of foreign-funded NGOs. The law 
requires CSOs to notify the 
government about planned trips of 
their representatives to foreign 
countries, and requires organizations 
to obtain approval for the receipt of 
all funds and assets from foreign 
states, organizations, and citizens.  
The regulation requires CSOs to obtain 
an approval from the Ministry of 
Justice to receive foreign funding.  
Venezuela Law for The Defense of political 
Sovereignty and National Self-
Determination (2010) 
2010 The law affects the operation of CSOs 
dedicated to the “defense of political 
rights” or other “political objectives” 
as they are not allowed to possess 
assets or receive any income from 
natural foreign citizens or foreign 
organizations. 
Sources: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2017; and IUPUI Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2018.
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obstructed, repressed, and closed. According to the most recent analysis (CIVICUS, 2017a), 15 
member states of the OECD have open civic spaces, while 16 member states – including the 
United States - have a narrowed civic space. In Hungary and Israel, the civic space became 
obstructed, while in Mexico and Turkey civil society is repressed (See Table Two for country-
specific information). It is clear that civic space has been shrinking not only in developing and 
emerging countries, but also in developed countries in North America and Western Europe.  
One of the reasons for the low rating of the Hungarian and Israeli civic space is that both 
countries have implemented NGO laws that target foreign-funded NGOs. Additionally, Turkey, 
whose civic space is repressed, might initiate more restrictive NGO laws as a consequence of the 
2016 coup attempt (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2017), while the Slovakia has 
discussed the draft of a foreign-funded NGO laws, similar to the Hungarian and the Israeli ones. 
Besides, several OECD countries, such as France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
have been reported to abuse NGOs by implementing anti-money laundering acts that 
unnecessarily overregulate the free operation of such organizations (European Parliament, 
2017). 
Both Hungary and Israel are high-income, developed, democratic countries, with very 
high-level human development indices. Additionally, both countries have introduced legislation 
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Both countries recently introduced foreign 
NGO laws that explicitly target foreign-funded NGOs. In addition, both governments seem to 
attack government critics and journalists. While international organizations as well as the 
European Union urged both Israel and Hungary to withdraw their legislation on foreign-funded 
NGOs, both countries have used the United States’ Foreign Agent Registration Act as an example 
to justify their new foreign NGO laws (Laufer, 2017).  
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Several OECD member states were reportedly restricting the operation of NGOs directly 
by introducing foreign NGO laws or indirectly by implementing anti-money laundering acts. 
Developed countries with multi-player political systems, open market economies, advanced 
accountability and transparency standards, and significant international trade started to feel 
threatened by foreign-funded NGOs, according to the government statements. However, these 
new restrictions may have negative consequences on the international stage. Indeed, the 
international reputations of countries such as Hungary, Israel, as well as Austria suffered after 
enacting their foreign NGO laws. Hungary and Israel passed foreign agents regulations to closely 
monitor and label foreign-funded NGOs operating in their countries, closing the space for NGOs 
focusing primarily on human rights and government transparency. Before analyzing these two 
cases and comparing them to the United States’ 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act, the thesis 
briefly explains the main regulations for foreign financial flows. 
1.6. Main regulations for cross-border financial flows 
1.6.1. Legislation on illicit financial flows, anti-money laundering, and combating the financing 
of terrorism 
Illicit financial flows are defined as “money illegally earned, transferred, or used that 
crosses borders” (The World Bank, 2017). The umbrella term emerged in the 1990s and it refers 
to cross-border movement of capital, including cross-border charitable donations. Two specific 
types of illicit financial flows are money laundering and terrorist financing. Both money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism are financial crimes with economic effects. Money 
laundering is “the processing of assets generated by criminal activity to obscure the link 
between the funds and their illegal origins,” while terrorism financing is “to raise money to 
support terrorist activities” (International Monetary Fund, 2017). The Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering, an intergovernmental organizational body, was established in 1989 
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with the objectives “to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory 
and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other 
related threats to the integrity of the international financial system”( Financial Action Task 
Force, 2017a).  
The Financial Action Task Force currently includes 35 member states and 2 regional 
organizations, such as the European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council. Countries 
and intergovernmental organizations are working to restrict money laundering. Although 
compliance is positively associated with the quality of the domestic regulatory framework as 
well as the countries’ economic development, compliance with the standards of anti-money 
laundering laws remained low in OECD countries (Yepes, 2011). The work of the International 
Monetary Fund, the Financial Action Task Force, as well as other intergovernmental 
organizations has expanded and accelerated after the terror attacks in the United States on 11th 
September, 2001, and since then the fight against money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism together became the main goals of such organizations.  
In October 2001, the Financial Action Task Force adopted eight special 
recommendations in connection with terrorist financing - one of them focusing on NGOs. Even 
though the Financial Action Task Force acknowledged the vital role of NGOs in the world 
economy as well as the national economies and social systems, they stated that terrorist groups 
had been exploiting the civil sector to “raise and move funds, provide logistical support, [and] 
encourage terrorist recruitment” (Financial Action Task Force, 2010, p.20). The Financial Action 
Task Force’s main arguments regarding the NGOs’ vulnerability were that these organizations 
have a global presence with access to the population, they enjoy a high level of public trust, they 
are not subject to general governmental oversight yet have access to considerable sources of 
funds, and they have large transitory workforces (Financial Action Task Force, 2010, 2014). 
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Therefore the Special Recommendation VIII on nonprofit organizations was established to 
ensure that NGOs will be not misused by terrorist organizations.  
Numerous countries started to implement such legislation to ensure the due diligence 
and accountability of NGOs. Even though the Financial Action Task Force promoted effective 
supervision and monitoring of such organizations, governments often introduced laws that 
overstepped the recommendation’s primary focus. More than 30 countries surveyed on the 
Index of Philanthropic Freedom (Hudson Institute, 2015) reported that illicit financial flows 
regulations have created barriers to legitimate nonprofit activities and therefore, such 
regulations have become one of the policies impeding philanthropic freedom across the world. 
Increased reporting requirements, stigmatization of organizations receiving foreign funding, and 
other legal tools damaged philanthropic activities in countries such as Russia and Turkey, where 
illicit financial flows regulations were used “to limit the autonomy of philanthropic actors, 
investigate and surveil groups critical of the government, and impede organizations attempting 
to access foreign funds” (Hudson institute, 2015, p. 10). 
The Financial Action Task Force revised Special Recommendation VIII in particular. The 
revised Special Recommendation VIII states the following (Financial Action Task Force, 2017b):  
 
“Countries  should  review  the  adequacy  of  laws  and  regulations  that  relate  
to  non –profit organizations  which  the  country  has  identified  as  being  
vulnerable  to  terrorist  financing abuse.  Countries  should  apply  focused  and  
proportionate  measures,  in  line  with  the  risk-based  approach,  to  such  non-
profit  organizations  to  protect  them  from  terrorist  financing abuse, 
including:  
(a) by terrorist organizations posing as legitimate entities; 
(b) by  exploiting  legitimate  entities  as  conduits  for  terrorist  financing,  
including  for  the  purpose of escaping asset-freezing measures; and 
(c) by  concealing  or  obscuring  the  clandestine  diversion  of  funds  intended  
for  legitimate  purposes to terrorist organizations.” 
 
After the 2012 revision was implemented, the Financial Action Task Force issued a 
revision in connection with the implementation of 49 of the recommendations in 2016 where it 
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stated that governments need to ensure the implementation of Special Recommendation VIII in 
line with a risk-based approach and “should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable 
activities” (Financial Action Task Force, 2017b, p. 53). Indeed, in 2016 the Financial Action Task 
Force released an interpretative note that says, “while [NGOs] are not immune from terrorist 
abuse, countries and donors should no longer view the entire sector as high risk” (Charities Aid 
Foundation of America, 2016). However, only 5 percent of the countries evaluated by the 
Financial Action Task Force in 2014 were fully compliant or largely compliant with Special 
Recommendation VIII. Several countries have used anti-money laundering and counter 
terrorism acts as a tool to control NGOs. Based on the European Parliament’s study (2017, p. 10-
11) several developed countries, such as France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
as well as numerous developing countries, as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Oman, 
Sudan, and Uganda implemented regulations that directly or indirectly narrowed the operation 
of NGOs. Since 2012, 98 laws restricting freedom of association or assembly were adopted 
around the world (Rutzen, 2015), and the trend of restricting NGOs ability to receive foreign 
funding seems to continue in both developing and developed countries. 
1.6.2. Foreign Agent Laws 
One of the tools to stigmatize foreign-funded NGOs has been the anti-foreign NGO laws. 
In general, foreign agent laws or similar regulations require NGOs to report their foreign 
financial resources when foreign contributions exceeds a certain dollar amount, register as 
“foreign agents” to a central agency, and use the term “foreign agents” or “foreign-supported 
organizations” in all their publications. Several countries, including India, Israel, Hungary, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine enacted such legislation to monitor and often label those NGOs 
that receive international funding (Anheier, 2017, Laufer 2017). After harsh international 
criticism, several of these countries recently claimed that their laws follow the 1938 Foreign 
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Agents Registration Act enacted by the United States when they adopted their foreign agent 
legislation (Rutzen, 2015).  
The 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act has a “disclosure statute that requires persons 
acting as agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic 
public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and 
disbursements in support of those activities” (fara.gov, 2017). However, in contrast to recent 
foreign agents legislation, the 1938 version did not target NGOs specifically, as such legislation 
in Hungary, Israel and other countries do today. Indeed, several exemptions are mentioned in 
the American legislation, including entities engaged in purely religious, scholastic, academic, 
artistic or scientific pursuits,  as well as entities engaged in the solicitation or collection of funds 
for medical aid or “for food and clothing to relieve human suffering” (U.S.C.A. §613). 
The 1938 FARA – and the 1945 Defense Regulations – did not target foreign-funded 
NGOs or the civil sector specifically, but it was intended to monitor political lobbying and 
propaganda (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017b). While it is hard to compare historic national 
security threats, such as the Nazi propaganda before and during the II World War, to current 
challenges, it is important to spotlight that even in the 1930s and 1940s the U.S. government did 
not have the intention to monitor or control the civil society in general. Furthermore, the 
labeling requirements set by these laws seem to be free of stigmatizing foreign-funded NGOs, 
therefore it is not to directly compare the 1938 FARA to the current Hungarian and Israeli 
regulations that target foreign-funded NGOs. 
In order to better understand the similarities and differences between the 1938 Foreign 
Agents Registration Act and the recently enacted foreign agents regulations in countries that are 
member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the cases of 
Israel and Hungary will be closely analyzed and compared, focusing on the wording of the 
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legislation, the governments’ reasoning, as well as the current economic, political, and social 
trends these countries face. 
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CHAPTER TWO: GENERAL OVERVIEW OF HUNGARY AND ISRAEL 
In order to compare Hungary and Israel, it is important to understand the political and 
social-cultural environment for civil society that influences the operation of both Hungarian and 
Israeli CSOs. Thus, this section provides a general overview of Hungary and Israel focusing on the 
economic, political, and socio-cultural characteristics of these countries as well as the 
regulations implemented by the Hungarian and Israeli governments against foreign-funded 
NGOs. 
Both Israel and Hungary are developed, democratic countries and members of the 
OECD. The Human Development Report (UNDP, 2016) characterizes both Hungary and Israel as 
countries with a very high level of human development. Both are high-income countries (World 
Bank, 2017), even though the Israeli per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (US$ 37,200) is 
almost three times larger than the Hungarian one (US$ 12,800). According to The Global 
Philanthropy Environment Index (IUPUI Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2018, p. 15) a 
“favorable philanthropic environment is strongly linked with higher per capita GDP.” Thus, the 
countries’ different level of GDP might help to explanation why Israel’s (3.83) global 
philanthropy environment index2 is higher than Hungary’s (3.30). 
In terms of political environment, both Hungary and Israel are parliamentary 
democracies, with a well-supported prime minister in charge. The Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban3 has been in office since 2010 and the government party has had 58% of the votes 
                                                            
2 The Global Philanthropy Environment Index (2018) studied 79 countries and economies using scores (1 
to 5) to classify 5 factors as enabling conditions for philanthropy: ease of operation of a philanthropic 
organization, tax incentives, cross-border flows, political environment and socio-cultural environment. 
The 79 countries and economies included in the report scored between 2.07 (Qatar) and 4.80 (Finland and 
the Netherlands and ) 
3 Prime Minister Viktor Orban (1963-) has served as Prime Minister of Hungary since 2010, winning two 
reelections in 2014 and 2018. He also served as Prime Minister between 1998 and 2002. Prime Minister 
Orban is the founding member of Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats) and has served as Chairman of 
Fidesz since 2003. In 1989 he served as a Member of the delegation to the Opposition Roundtable that 
prepared the peaceful transition to democracy in the country. 
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in the Parliament since. The political forces are similar in Israel, as Benjamin Netanyahu4 has 
served as the Israeli Prime Minister since 2009 and the government party has enjoyed 55% of 
the votes at the Knesset since 2015.  
Both prime ministers have strong opinions about foreign-funded NGOs as a possible 
threat of their country’s stability and security. Regarding the foreign agents regulation, Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu stated in January 2016 that “[t]ransparency is the heart of 
democracy. When you hear about the use and abuse of NGOs here – transparency is the least 
we want and is much warranted and it is common sense” (Ravid, 2016). Hungarian Prime 
Minister Orban used a very similar argument one year later: “who receive money from abroad 
to influence Hungarian politics should admit this fact and make it public: they should be 
transparent and should be accountable, just like political parties. Hungarians are right to 
demand this” (Website of The Hungarian Government, 2017n). Both the Israeli and the 
Hungarian governments, enjoying the absolute majority in the parliament, supported the 
enactment of the foreign agents regulations in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Soon after, 
Freedom House observed that both countries fostered a less favorable political environment for 
civil society. Both countries were ranked as free, although their score of civil liberties dropped 
due to the enactment of new regulations oppressing foreign-funded NGOs (Freedom House, 
2018a). 
Despite the similar economic and political environment, the countries differ from each 
other in regard to the size and scope of civil society as well as their socio-cultural environment. 
                                                            
4 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (1949-) has served as the Prime Minister of Israel since 2009, 
winning two reelections in 2013 and 2015. He also held the position between 1996 and 1999. Prime 
Minister Netanyahu has served as Chairman of the Likud party since 1993 and as the Leader of the Likud 
party since 2005. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Prime Minster Netanyahu has served in different positions 
– such as Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations or as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – to 
represent Israel in the international arena. 
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In 1995, the Israeli civil society sector represented a ten times larger share of the employment 
market than the Hungarian one, at 13.2% and 1.3% respectively. The difference was not as 
significant regarding the GDP produced by CSOs; Israeli CSOs produced 5.6% while the 
Hungarian CSOs produced only 2.8% of their country’s total GDP (Salamon et al., 1999). In the 
last two decades, the civil society sector grew in both countries, but the Israeli civil society 
sector has continued to be one of the biggest in the world (Einolf, 2015, p. 514-515). In 2018, 
Israeli CSOs produce 5.8% of Israel’s GDP and employ over 477,000 people, representing 13.7% 
of the Israeli workforce. By comparison, Hungarian CSOs produce over 4% of Hungary’s GDP and 
employ over 150,000 people, representing 3.5% of the Hungarian workforce (Samson, 2018, 
KSH, 2018). The only indicator in which Hungary overtakes Israel is the number of CSOs. In 
Hungary there are over 61,600 CSOs, while in Israel this number merely reach 42,000 (Samson, 
2018, KSH, 2018). Besides their size, the scope of Hungarian and Israeli civil society also differs in 
these two countries. Israeli CSOs primarily address social issues related to arts and culture, 
health care, social services, and religion. Hungarian CSOs also focus on health and social services 
as well as culture, but education and sport are dominant too (IUPUI Lilly Family School of 
Philanthropy, 2018).  
Another important aspect of the socio-cultural environment is the influence of religion 
in the culture of giving. In this aspect, the two countries show very distinctive characteristics. In 
Hungary, 67% of the people are Christian, 51% of them identify themselves as Roman Catholic 
(U.S. Department of State, 2017), while more than 20% of the respondents report no religious 
affiliation. Even though the Christian roots of giving have influenced civil society in Hungary, 
giving and volunteering became secularized and less-practiced during the socialist era between 
1949 and 1989. The government has been seen as the primary social service provider, even after 
the political and economic transition in 1989. On the other hand, religion is an important 
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component of the Israeli civil society and giving. Seventy-five percent of the Israeli population 
identify themselves as Jewish, 18% as Muslim and 2% as Christian. Religion has an important 
role not only to promote giving through the Jewish and Muslim traditions, but also to contribute 
to the cultural and national identity. Both Jews and Arabs consider being religious and religion to 
be a significant part of their identity (Cooperman et al., 2016). Thus, religious differences in 
Israel have influenced the social and political space as well as the civil sector. Despite the 
Muslim percentage of the population, only 12% of CSOs represent Arab-Palestinian citizens and 
those organizations are often targeted by the government and are left out from cross-sectoral 
cooperation (Almog-Bar, 2016, p. 240). The Transparency Law mainly affects the operation of 
pro-Palestinian organizations too, deepening the religious and political tension in the society.  
The socio-cultural differences can be also observed through the results of the World 
Giving Index 2017 published by Charities Aid Foundation. The report analyzes giving behavior 
across the world by measuring three different indicators of giving: helping a stranger who 
needed help, donating money to a CSO, and volunteering to an organization. In terms of the 
overall score, Israel ranked the 35 out of 139 countries, while Hungary was only the 119th 
country (Charities Aid Foundation, 2017). 
However, in terms of the rise of civil society, CSOs played a crucial role in building 
democracy in both countries. In Hungary, CSOs were important parts of the political and 
economic transition of the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s, while in Israel, CSOs 
provided tremendous resources to form the country economic and social policies since the 
1970s. Both governments have acknowledged the importance of domestic CSOs as well as the 
contribution of volunteers, however, recently both Hungary and Israel targeted and labeled 
foreign-funded NGOs and accused them of representing foreign interests. The Hungarian 
government has identified the global, international capital – particularly the interests of the 
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Hungarian-American investor, Mr. Soros – as the driving force behind foreign-funded NGOs that 
try to interfere domestic policies including the ones related to the Syrian refugee crisis. The 
Israeli government, on the other hand, has claimed that NGOs funded by foreign governments 
might interfere with domestic issues by promoting pro-Palestinian values and criticizing the 
government’s policies.  
The language used by both governments was influenced by the challenges Hungary and 
Israel have faced. In the case of Hungary, the 2015 refugee crisis put the country in a difficult 
situation and the government chose to close their borders and refused to offer governmental 
support to refugees arriving from Syria and other Middle-Eastern countries. The Hungarian 
government was criticized by foreign governments and international organizations because of 
the way the country handled the refugee crisis. Among other critics, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the measures Hungary introduced in response to 
the migration crisis contravene international law; and the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe expressed his concern about whether the Hungarian laws comply with the provisions of 
the Geneva Convention (Novak, 2015). As a consequence of international criticism, the 
Hungarian government attacks against foreign-funded NGOs have increased and the 
government communication changed to emphasize that foreign-funded NGOs aim to help illegal 
migrants and therefore threaten the security of the nation. 
Simultaneously, Israel has faced the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Starting in 
September 2015, the conflict continued with an increased level of violence between the two 
nations. The “Wave of Terror” escalated the government’s anti-Palestinian statements and 
oppressed the left-wing, liberal NGOs that often raised concerns about the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and criticized the governmental responses. On several occasions, the government 
extended the state of emergency, which has been continuously in place since the country’s 
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establishment in 1948. The dichotomy of acknowledging and supporting domestic CSOs while 
simultaneously targeting and oppressing foreign-funded NGOs characterizes both governments’ 
relationship with their civil society. 
The case studies in Chapter 3 and 4 argue that the Hungarian and Israeli governments 
used similar arguments to introduce their own foreign agents regulation. One of those 
arguments was to increase transparency among CSOs. In the last two decades, the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) has encouraged countries to adopt legislation against illicit financial 
flows, including money laundering and terrorism financing. However, according to the 2015 
Index of Philanthropic Freedom (Hudson Institute, 2015), legislation seeking to limit illicit 
financial flows has become one of the most common policies that hinders the operation of 
philanthropic organizations in countries all around the world. To analyze whether the 
transparency of civil society can be increased by the foreign agents regulations adopted by 
Hungary and Israel, it is important to analyze both the countries’ legal environment, including 
the reason for enhancing transparency, and the organizations that have been affected by such 
laws.  
In case of the legal environment, both countries grant the freedom of associations and 
assembly: Hungary in its Fundamental Law, and Israel through the implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is important that both countries have 
adopted pieces of legislation related to anti-money laundering and counter terrorism, but these 
laws explicitly do not regulate the work of CSOs. However, the general CSO regulations, such as 
the Act CLXXV of 2011 on the Freedom of Association, Public Benefit Status, and the Operation 
and Support of Civil Society Organizations in Hungary or the Amutot Law, 5740-1980 and the 
Companies Law, 5759-1997 in Israel, do require CSOs to submit their annual financial reports to 
the central Registrar as well as make these reports available for the public. 
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Transparency of CSOs is important for two reasons: to fight against illicit financial flows 
and to enhance the organizations’ and therefore the sector’s legitimacy. First of all, in terms of 
illicit financial flows, the FATF acknowledged that terrorist groups had been exploiting the civil 
sector to “raise and move funds, provide logistical support, [and] encourage terrorist 
recruitment” (Financial Action Task Force, 2010, p.20). However, as the FATF’s Special 
Recommendation VIII on NGOs was adopted, several countries abused this legislation to go 
beyond oversight and actually narrow the freedom of CSOs. Therefore, even though 
transparency remained one of the most important tools against illicit financial flows, FATF 
highlighted that such legislation should not alter or prevent the work of legitimate CSOs 
(Financial Action Task Force, 2017b).  
Besides the fight against illicit financial flows, transparency is also important to support 
CSOs’ legitimacy. The lack of transparency can undermine the public trust towards CSOs, 
especially if the organization is attempting to influence the public policy (Lehr-Lehnardt, 2005). 
Transparency can be more relevant for international CSOs (Mertus, 1999), but as the role of 
CSOs has increased in the last two to three decades, stakeholders started to demand more 
transparency and accountability from all CSOs, especially when CSOs work on advocacy and 
might influence public policy (Brown and Jagadanada, 2007). Finally, as numerous organizations 
that have come under attack by the foreign agents regulations advocate for government 
accountability and transparency, it is important that they set the example. 
It is clear that both Hungary and Israel introduced legislation to fight against illicit 
financial flows as well as to require a certain level of transparency from all CSOs prior to their 
foreign agents regulations. However, if the Hungarian and the Israeli governments had aimed to 
increase transparency among civil society organizations, they would have a much broader 
definition of those organizations that are affected by the foreign agents regulations. Through 
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these pieces of legislation, Hungary regulated the registration of and reporting requirements for 
foreign-funded organizations that receive HUF 7,2 million (US$ 29,000) or more from foreign 
donors and Israel only targets organizations that receive funds from foreign government 
entities. Both segments are relatively small compared to the countries’ entire civil society. 
Therefore, these laws cannot enhance the transparency of the sector in general. Indeed both 
foreign agents regulations were criticized as discriminative and having the potential to 
undermine the values of democracy (European Commission, 2017d, European Union External 
Action Service, 2016).   
In addition to transparency, another argument used by both the Hungarian and Israeli 
governments was that the new laws helped protect state sovereignty and national security. 
Both countries argued that the implementation of such laws “protect the sovereignty of their 
states from foreign interference in domestic political affairs” (Rutzen, 2015, p. 24). The 
Hungarian Prime Minister Orban stated several times that foreign funded organizations 
“represent foreign interest” and their goal is “political interference” (Website of The Hungarian 
Government, 2017b). The Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said that the foreign agents 
regulation “prevents an absurd situation in which foreign countries interfere in Israel’s internal 
affairs” (Eglash and Booth, 2016).  
Despite protecting state sovereignty, the enacted pieces of legislation not only 
enhanced the reporting requirements of foreign-funded organizations – that, in case of 
Hungary, often do not provide advocacy or lobbying activities at all – but also created a platform 
to stigmatize these organizations by creating a harsh, negative propaganda against them and 
labelling them publicly as foreign-funded organizations.  
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CHAPTER THREE: HUNGARY AND THE ACT ON THE TRANSPARENCY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM ABROAD 
This chapter focuses on the Hungarian Foreign NGO Act. First, the chapter discusses the 
development of Hungarian civil sector briefly, focusing on the time period after the 1989 
democratic transition. Next, the current legislation will be examined: the Act CLXXV of 2011 on 
the Freedom of Association, Public Benefit Status, and the Operation and Support of Civil 
Society Organizations (Civil Act), the new Act LIII of 2017 on Prevention of Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism (Anti-money Laundering Act).  Then, the chapter analyses the 
Hungarian government’s arguments for the establishment of the Foreign NGO Act and the 
language in Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from 
Abroad (Foreign NGO Act) before describing how the government campaign against foreign-
funded NGOs intensified after the implementation of the Foreign NGO Act. Finally, as Hungary is 
a European Union Member State, the European Union’s position is briefly presented. 
Hungary is one of the OECD countries that most recently adopted an anti-foreign NGO 
law. The Freedom in the World 2018 report published by Freedom House draws attention to the 
“increasing intimidation of civil society groups” in Hungary. Even though Hungary’s freedom 
status in the report remained free in 2017, this country experienced the tenth largest decline in 
civic freedom in the last decade (Freedom House, 2018a). NGOs receiving foreign charitable 
contributions have been under attack by the government and targeted through the adoption of 
the Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad 
(Foreign NGO Act). Hungary became the second OECD country, after Israel, to have labelled 
NGOs that receive foreign funding by requiring burdensome reporting activities and creating a 
new legal category for “organization support from abroad.” 
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In Hungary the legal term “civil society organization” includes foundations, associations, 
public benefit organizations and other organizations established under the right of associations 
(Act CCXIII of 2013, Article 7.1). The term “nongovernmental organizations” (NGOs) has recently 
become the preferred legal term for foreign-funded civil society organizations that were 
described by the Hungarian government as organizations that “set up local offices in various 
countries, which recruit activists and also usually pay them, and which represent international 
interests – usually the interests of global, international capital”(Website of The Hungarian 
Government, 2017a). Therefore, the chapter uses the terms accordingly: CSOs refer to 
registered organizations under the Hungarian legislation, while NGOs refer to foreign-funded 
CSOs that became primarily targeted by the Foreign NGO Act. 
3.1. The way towards “Hungarian illiberal democracy” 
Hungarian CSOs were not allowed to operate independently during the socialist era. The 
1949 Constitution granted the rights of freedom of assembly and associations: “in order to 
improve the social, economic and cultural activities of workers, the People's Republic of Hungary 
provides constitutional rights to the right of association” (Article 56). Despite the ruling, the 
Socialist Party “rejected the concept of independent organizations, asserting that independence 
from the ‘state of the people’ was a meaningless idea” (Cox & Wass, 1995, p. 160). There was no 
official registration procedure for independent civil society organizations; co-operatives and 
trade unions had to operate under the governmental umbrella organization. 
In the 1980s Hungarian civil society started to gain power, especially through 
environmental and student movements, culminating in the 1989 transition to democracy. The 
role of both registered and unregistered CSOs was crucial to start a public discourse, engage 
different social groups and create an enabling environment to lead towards the democratic 
transition in 1989. In 1989 the Parliament revised the Constitution and adopted the Law II of 
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1989 on the Freedom of Association that allowed the existence and registration of independent, 
autonomous groups, as “social organizations.” The new legislation broadened the activities of 
civil society organizations stating that “social organizations can be established for the purpose of 
carrying out activities that are consistent with the Constitution and which are not prohibited by 
law” (Article 2.3.). Furthermore, the law stated that “registration of a social organization cannot 
be denied if its founders have fulfilled the requirements of this law” (Article 4.1), which led to a 
significant increase of registered associations: in 1989 there were 8,514 registered associations, 
while by 1992 their number reached 19,950, more than doubling in three years (Cox & Wass, 
1995). The Hungarian society began to exercise its right of the freedom of associations 
immediately after the autocratic government began lose its power in the late 1980s. In 1989 
Hungary experienced a transition to democracy: a political transition where multi-party, free 
and fair elections, parliamentary system, and the separation of powers were established and an 
economic transition from planned economy to market economy.  
During and after the democratic transition, a heterogeneous civil society arose in 
Hungary (Csanády 1998). New pieces of legislation passed, such as the 1993 Civil Code that 
introduced new legal forms of CSOs including public law foundations, public benefit companies, 
and public law associations; the Act CXXVI of 1996 Law on the Use of a Specified Portion of 
Personal Income Tax (otherwise known as “1% Act”) that allows taxpayers to designate one or 
two percent of his/her paid personal income tax to qualified civil society and religious 
organizations; and the Act CLVI of 1997 on Public Benefit Organizations that provided tax 
incentives for both individuals and corporations, established two degrees of public benefit 
organizations, and required more transparency and accountability from public benefit 
organizations.  
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In addition, the Hungarian public administration of that time aimed to strengthen CSOs 
by providing financial support to these organizations. From 1990 through 1997 the total amount 
of central government support to CSOs increased by 10 times (Csóka, 2000). After the economic 
transition, the government heavily relied on CSOs to provide social services for those in need as 
the level of unemployment, poverty as well as homelessness increased dramatically in the early 
1990s (Klaudt, 1995). Cooperation between the government and CSOs was increasing both in 
the decision-making process and policy implementations. The Hungarian government was 
willing to satisfy the standards established by the Western world in order to successfully join the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (joined on May 7, 1996), the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (joined on March 12, 1999), the European Union (joined on May 1, 
2004), and other intergovernmental organizations.  
While the Hungarian CSO legislation was established and the cooperation between the 
governmental and civil sector improved in the 1990s (Csanádi 1998, Csóka 2000), the sector still 
struggled to operate in the established political structure. Szabó (1991 in Lomax 1997) 
emphasized that the old elite remained in crucial positions that might have resulted in CSOs 
remaining relatively unknown to the majority of the society. Cox and Wass (1995) noted that 
associations and other CSOs were rather weak and fragmented with no effective links to the 
political sphere in the 1990s. 
However, the positive changes in the legislation created an enabling environment for 
Hungarian civil society: the number of CSOs were increasing as well as the aggregate revenue of 
CSOs (KSH, 2016). In 2003 the Hungarian government increased the amount of government 
funding available to CSOs (Act L of 2003) and recognized and supported volunteering work (Act 
LXXXVIII of 2005). Simultaneously, the level of tax incentives for charitable contributions was 
decreasing in the beginning of 2000s, and by the end of the 2008 economic crisis, individuals 
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and private entrepreneurs were no longer entitled to tax incentives for charitable contributions 
as a government austerity measure. Thus, civil society has remained heavily dependent on 
government funding both politically (Dobszay 2014) and economically (KSH 2015). In 2012, for 
the first time after the democratic transition, all three macro indicators of the civil sector 
decreased: number of registered organizations, the aggregate revenue of CSOs, and the rate of 
employment in the civil sector. The number of registered CSOs has been decreasing since then 
due to the fact that the 2011 Civil Law initiated a cleansing process within the sector (Article 11).  
Since 2013, intensifying government attacks against Hungarian CSOs have been 
observed. In August 2013, the government related newspapers published lists of CSOs that they 
suspected of serving foreign interests, and these sentiments were echoed by the governing 
party’s spokesperson. Some of these organizations, such as the Okotars Foundation, received 
funds through the framework of the EEA/Norway Grants NGO Fund5. Two days after the 2014 
Hungarian parliamentary election - where the victory of the governing parties preserved the 
power of Prime Minister Orban - the Prime Minister’s Office claimed that Okotars Foundation 
had practiced political influence by being close to the opposition party. In May 2014, Norway 
suspended the Norway Grants NGO Fund because of the Hungarian government’s accusation. 
The Government Control Office started an audit on the Fund by the Hungarian government’s 
request. During the audit, the Government Control Office requested materials from 58 CSOs 
supported by the Fund with very short notice. In addition, the Okotars Foundation and DemNet 
– both receiving funds from the Norwegian Government –  were raided by police. These CSOs’ 
tax numbers, and by extension, their legal operations, were temporarily suspended by 
                                                            
5 The EEA Grants and Norway Grants are financial contribution of Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway to 
reducing economic and social disparities and to strengthening bilateral relations with 15 EU countries in 
Central and Southern Europe (EEA Grants, 2018). Since 2015, the EEA/Norway Grants have been partly 
suspended in Hungary. Please find more: https://eeagrants.org/  
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September 2014 (Eotvos Karoly Policy institute et al., 2014). It was the first government attack 
against foreign-funded CSOs and Hungarian civil society in general.  
Hungary’s largest newspaper supporting social-democratic values was closed down in 
2016 while public media, which “generally adhere to progovernmental narratives” have enjoyed 
increasing government funding in the last years (Freedom House, 2016). Since 2015, Freedom 
House’s “Nations in Transit” publication has classified Hungary’s regime as semi-consolidated 
democracy and in 2017 Hungary had the lowest ranking in the Central European region as “the 
government has now snuffed out most of the critical media and built an efficient machine of 
state capture and grand corruption” (Freedom House, 2017). 
According to the CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia 
published by USAID, the CSO sustainability index has been decreasing in Hungary since 1998. 
Between 2010 and 2016 the decline was significant, especially in the cases of legal environment, 
financial viability, and public image. According to USAID (2017), the government’s continued 
“vilification campaign” has had a strong, negative affect on the public image of CSOs, while 
foreign-funded organizations came under government attacks that decreased both cross-border 
and domestic funding of such organizations. In 2017 the Hungarian government has 
consolidated its power by “uprooting democratic institutions and intimidating critics in civil 
society” as well as passing laws oppressing the activities of foreign-funded nongovernmental 
organizations (Freedom House, 2018c, p. 16.).  
By 2017, Hungary became one of the countries whose democratic freedom has 
dramatically declined in the last decade, and scored the lowest in political rights and civil 
liberties within the European Union’s Member States (Freedom House, 2018c). Before the 
chapter discusses the Foreign NGO Act and the related government campaign, it is important to 
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understand the legislation related to CSOs and anti-money laundering that went into action 
prior to the Foreign NGO Act. 
3.2. Hungarian legislation to enhance CSO transparency and prevent money laundering 
In Hungary, the legal framework for CSOs is the Act CLXXV of 2011 on the Freedom of 
Association, Public Benefit Status, and the Operation and Support of Civil Society Organizations 
(Civil Act) and the Civil Code V of 2013. The Act LIII of 2017 on Prevention of Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism (Anti-money Laundering Act) is also relevant to better 
understand how the government has fought against money laundering and financing terrorism. 
The new Civil Act in 2011, which applied to foundations, associations, public benefit 
organizations and other organizations established under the right of associations (Article 1), 
“caused disappointments” within the sector (USAID, 2012). USAID (2012) stated that the unclear 
interpretation and dubious implementation of the legislation caused “uncertainty and confusion 
among CSOs.” However, the Civil Act was supposed to address several problems, such as 
simplified public benefit status for registered CSOs, well-established transparency and 
accountability policies, and clearly defined state funding. The Civil Act introduced the one-step 
qualification for public benefit organizations. Organizations applying for such status need to 
provide state tasks, have adequate resources, and demonstrate adequate level of public support 
(Article 32.1). The Civil Act also focused on the sector’s transparency and accountability. It 
created a unified, public electronic database – the Civil Information Portal – to introduce 
electronic registration and reporting for CSOs (Article 14), but the portal was only introduced in 
2015, and online registration and reporting has been only mandatory for public benefit 
organizations – that, after a huge drop, is only 19% of registered CSOs (KSH, 2018). Furthermore, 
the Civil Act introduced a reporting system for CSOs in order to make the sector more 
transparent. CSOs need to submit an annual report about their operational, financial, and 
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income status (Article 28) and prepare a public benefit annex (Article 29) and make both 
documents available on their websites (Article 30). External audit is required of CSOs with 
annual incomes of HUF 300 million (US $ 1,200 million) or more (USAID, 2015). The Civil Act also 
established a new government financing system: the National Cooperation Fund. Despite the 
aim of more transparent government funding, the Committee of the National Cooperation Fund 
is dominated by government-appointed representatives (Article 60) and the minister can 
allocate personally 10 percent of the funding (Article 56). Finally, even though the Civil Act 
reestablished corporate tax benefits for charitable contributions to CSOs with public benefit 
status, tax incentives for individuals have not been reintroduced since 2009. 
The new Civil Code was adopted in 2013 and entered into force in 2014 also had several 
implications on CSOs. In terms of associations, the new Civil Code established new procedures 
for conducting general assemblies (Article 3:55) as well as an extension of a board’s liability after 
a CSO’s dissolution (Article 3:21 and 6:536). In regard to foundations, the Civil Code re-
introduced the concept of private foundations (Article 3:376), established the extension of 
board liability, and mandated the involuntary termination of foundations if they do not engage 
in worthwhile activities for more than three years (Article 3:400). Furthermore, CSOs had to 
adapt their statutes to the provisions of the Civil Code by March 15, 2017that created 
burdensome responsibilities for smaller CSOs. In the original text of the law, the deadline was 
March 15, 2016 which was modified by the Hungarian Parliament to provide more time for CSOs 
to adapt these requirements. 
The third relevant legislation for the study is the Act LIII of 2017 on Prevention of Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (Anti-money Laundering Act). The legislation was 
adopted after The Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on The Evaluation of Anti-money 
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) claimed that Hungary should 
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conduct a formal review of the entire civil sector in order to identify and monitor NPOs that 
could potentially pose a higher risk for financing terrorism (MONEYVAL, 2016). However, the 
Anti-money Laundering Act did not included CSOs among the organizations and service 
providers that are required to abide by the statutory provisions. The main intents of the Anti-
money Laundering Act were to implement the provision of the 4th Anti-money Laundering 
Directive established by the European Union. The law outlines the new requirements for 
organizations and includes the possibility of electronic identity verification of clients/ customers 
who are part of any financial transactions (Article 7), the establishment of a central database 
(Article 25), and stricter and higher amount of penalties in case of unlawful activities (Article 69).  
As the further analysis of the Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organizations 
Receiving Support from Abroad will show, the regulations regarding the registration and 
reporting requirements of foreign-funded organizations are discriminative against the operation 
of such organizations and do not serve anti-money laundering purposes as only one segment of 
the civil sector is addressed by the Foreign NGO Act.  
3.3. Foreign-funded NGOs under government attack 
3.3.1. Government critics and government-related studies prior to the announcement of the 
draft law 
Since early 2017, the Hungarian government introduced a negative campaign against 
foreign-funded CSOs, otherwise known as NGOs. While the government several times declared 
that the role of civil society is important and valuable for the Hungarian society, NGOs have 
increasingly been characterized as organizations that represent “foreign influence” whose goal 
is “political interference” (Website of The Hungarian Government, 2017b). Prime Minister Orban 
has underlined several times the importance of the regulation of foreign-funded NGOs, but as 
the subchapter shows, the political arguments for such legislation have shifted from 
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emphasizing transparency of the civil sector to positioning the legislation as a safeguard against 
Soros-funded organizations that threaten the country’s stability. However, such foreign-funded 
NGOs often provide crucial social services, from mitigating corruption and promoting 
transparency and accountability in the public sphere of the decision-making processes 
(Transparency International, 2018), through promoting democracy and independent journalism 
(The Open Society Foundations, 2018) to human and minority rights (Helsinki Committee, 2018). 
Indeed, NGOs often support social services that a government may primarily be responsible for, 
including educational and health care programs, child and homeless care activities, and 
environmental initiatives.  
The Hungarian government started to make a clear distinction between foreign-funded 
NGOs and CSOs in order to describe NGOs in negative terms. Allegedly, NGOs became a primary 
focus because of lack of transparency and accountability – even though they had to follow the 
same reporting requirements as other CSOs and prepare and publish an annual report, a public-
benefit annex, and a report on donations. Prime Minister Orban described NGOs as “large-scale 
predators,” “Hungarian depots of international organizations … [that] have been here, under our 
skin or under our nails as a thread,” and claimed that these organizations “represent 
international interests,” and therefore want to “hide behind the term of civil society 
organizations” (Magyarorszag Kormanya, 2017b)6. These terms clearly show that the Hungarian 
government used harsh, offensive criticisms to negatively influence the public image of foreign-
funded NGOs in the country. Even though the campaign avoided inflammatory terms such as 
“foreign agents,” the wording of the campaign was clearly aimed at making foreign-funded 
                                                            
6 All quotations cited from Magyarorszag Kormanya is available in Hungarian and have been translated 
into English by the author.  
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NGOs appear as representatives of foreign interests that aim to attack Hungarian integrity and 
political stability. 
The presence and activity of foreign-funded NGOs became one of the main issues to be 
addressed by the Hungarian government in 2017. In his address in Parliament before the start of 
daily business on February 20, 2017, Prime Minister Orban stated that foreign-funded 
international networks have attempted to influence internal politics in countries such as the 
United States and France. Thus, “transparency, accountability, and openness” are required from 
NGOs in order not to allow “global capital to make decisions instead of the Hungarian people” 
(Magyarorszag Kormanya, 2017c). By March 2017, the Hungarian government directly targeted 
NGOs, stating that such organizations could undermine the Hungarian value system as well as 
the country’s safety and stability. On March 15, the anniversary of the 1848 Revolution, Prime 
Minister Orban said that “either the past or the future of the Hungarian nation …, the security of 
the European people, … [or] whether or not we remain Hungarian does not matter to Brussels 
and international capital [referring to foreign-funded NGOs] (Website of The Hungarian 
Government, 2017g).  
Since late March, NGOs were accused of being part of the “migrant business.” In 2015, 
over one million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe from the Middle East, resulting in 
one of the biggest refugee flows since World War II. Hungary was impacted by the inflow of 
refugees as a transit country, receiving the highest ratio of political asylum applications per 
population among all European countries receiving refugees in 2015 (Connor, 2016). The 
Hungarian government introduced anti-refugee policies such as planning to build a border fence 
along its borders with Serbia and Croatia, introducing a “zero refugee” policy, rejecting the 
proposed European Union quota system to resettling refugees, and adopting a law that allows 
the detention of migrants in temporary camps. The Hungarian government anti-immigration 
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campaign remained in the political agenda despite the fact that the number of migrants 
significantly dropped after physically closing the country’s Southern borders. Since March 2017, 
foreign-funded NGOs have been portrayed as organizations that support illegal immigration and 
therefore, organizations that operate against the Hungarian public. 
Statements of illegal immigration against NGOs increased after March 14, when the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) gave its judgement in the case Ilias and Ahmed V. 
Hungary (no. 47287/15), The Hungarian Helsinki Committee represented two Bangladeshi 
nationals, Mr. Ilias and Mr. Ahmed, who applied for asylum immediately after arriving in 
Hungary, where they were held in a transit zone for 23 days. They complained that their 
detention conditions at the transit zone violated their human rights. The court found that the 
Hungarian authorities did violate several articles of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and therefore the Hungarian government was sanctioned by EUR 28,705 (US$ 35,300) 
that includes the non-pecuniary damage caused to the applicants as well as their costs and 
expenses incurred before the Court (ECHR, 2017). After this case, the government started to use 
the terms “illegal migration” and “participation of migration business” to support the necessity 
of a Foreign NGO Act. The Government Spokesperson stated that there are problems with 
foreign-funded NGOs that are “concerned with ‘the migrant business,’ or with the protection of 
human rights which induces the violation of international law and the sovereignty of a country” 
(Website of The Hungarian Government, 2017h). 
Simultaneously, the government-related Szazadveg Foundation released its survey on 
social trust in February 2017 and its study of NGOs as political actors in March 2017. The 
Szazadveg Foundation is “an independent think-tank organization, whose primary aim is to 
articulate and forward the issues and processes concerning Hungarian society and public 
interests, and to publish a clearly written and objective analysis of these processes” (ENOP, 
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2018). However, the Foundation received several critics in the last couple of years regarding its 
biased studies and strong connection with and financial dependence on the current ruling party. 
The Foundation was established by Fidesz members, and received several critics have stated 
that not only has the Foundation created “bogus studies” using taxpayer’s money (index.hu, 
2012, hvg.hu, 2015, hvg.hu 2018), but it has also manipulated polls’ results to support the 
government’s ideology and goals (The Budapest Beacon, 2016) Therefore, the survey and study 
published by the Foundation in connection with foreign-funded NGOs might have been served 
directly the aims of the ruling party to provide an appearance of a professionally-grounded 
dialogue. 
According to the Survey on Social Trust by the government-influenced Szazadveg 
Foundation, (Szazadveg Foundation, 2017a), “the majority of the [Hungarian] population does 
not trust foreign-funded NGOs, but they trust domestic civil society organizations.” The survey 
analyzed the level of social trust towards different public and nonprofit institutions, such as 
public schools, the military, the European Union, the United Nations, the Supreme Court, the 
media, and civil society organizations. According to the survey, 56% of the Hungarian population 
trust domestic civil society organizations, and only 29% of the Hungarian population trust 
foreign-funded NGOs. However, we can infer that the nonprofit sector in general has a low level 
of social trust, as domestic civil society organizations were ranked 14, and foreign-funded NGOs 
were ranked dead last among the 17 institutions the survey covered. The results emphasized the 
importance of NGO regulation, and provided evidence to support the government’s claim that 
public opinion is against the activities of foreign-funded NGOs. 
The study of NGOs as political actors, published by the government-influenced 
Szazadveg Foundation (2017b), focused on foreign-funded NGOs and their political roles. The 
study discussed the political roles and power of foreign-funded NGOs, their democratic 
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legitimacy as well as their accountability. The study also drew attention to the fact that foreign-
funded NGOs were strongly dependent on their donors, suggesting that these organization 
could easily become the lobbyists of their donors (Szazadveg Foundation, 2017b, p. 10). The 
study also issued recommendations such as the creation of NGO legislation to address the 
lobbying activities of foreign-funded NGOS. This recommendation was allegedly based on 
“Western regulatory trends,” due to the fact that the political role of NGOs on agenda setting 
and influencing the public opinion has increased recently in the West and around the world. We 
can infer that this study established the legal need for an anti-foreign NGO Law and indirectly 
authorized the government to introduce the Draft Law on the Transparency of Organizations 
Receiving Support from Abroad. 
Based on the government language and the studies published by Szazadveg Foundation, 
the following arguments can be identified to support the implementation of a Foreign NGO Act: 
- Transparency and accountability – since the public trust towards foreign-funded NGOs is low 
and such organizations’ activities might impact the country’s political stability, transparency 
might help stakeholders better understand and monitor the operation of NGOs; 
- Fight against illegal immigration – as NGOs might support illegal immigration and therefore 
human trafficking, their operation might violate both international and national laws; 
- Fight against foreign-funded lobbying – as NGOs might influence domestic politics and the 
2018 election – as seen in the recent elections in the United States and in France – a 
possible legislation might prevent such unlawful activities. 
3.3.2. Changing rhetoric and preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission 
After an online media outlet, 444.hu, leaked the first version of the draft law on April 2, 
the ruling party’s members of Parliament submitted the Act T/14967 on the Transparency of 
Organizations Receiving Foreign Funds to the Hungarian Parliament on April 7, 2017. The draft 
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law required organizations receiving foreign funds over a certain yearly threshold to register 
themselves, and to label themselves as “organizations receiving foreign funds” on their website 
and in their publications.  
On April 10, Peter Szijjarto, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, became the first 
person in the current debate about NGOs to refer to the U.S. 1938 Foreign Agents Registration 
Act, stating that the Foreign NGO Act “is also required in the United States, "in a certain form"” 
(Magyarorszag Kormanya, 2017a). However, he did not elaborate on this claim or provide direct 
evidence for it. On April 16, during his Easter interview, Prime Minister Orban underscored again 
the difference between CSOs and NGOs. The latter were characterized as international lobbying 
organizations that want to influence public authority and political decisions. Additionally, he 
referred to the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act, without any further specification, 
highlighting that the Hungarian Foreign NGO Act would not be as strict as the American one 
(Website of the Hungarian Government, 2017i): 
 
“In America these organisations are called ‘agent’ organisations, and so 
far Europe has not been required to face the question of how to regulate their 
activities. Now we have said that we could adopt the US model – but American 
legislation is too strict even for my liking. That won’t work for us. Here we have 
had a dictatorship or two in the past, and we don’t like things like that. So all we 
want – but this is something we have a right to – is for every Hungarian to be 
able to see and find out the identity and motives of those who fund 
organisations which voice their views on matters which are important in terms 
of public policy and the future of the community.”  
 
Prime Minister Orban made it clear for the public that the legislation in the United 
States are much stricter without mentioning the name of the regulation itself. However, in 
accordance with the Russian and Israeli references, we can conclude that the comment referred 
to the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act, which primarily regulates NGOs that conduct 
lobbying activities. 
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In April, not only was the American legislation frequently mentioned by the ruling party, 
but also NGOs became identified as organizations supported by George Soros7. Mr. Soros’ name 
and its possible influence in politics were often mentioned by the government as a possible 
reason to implement a Foreign NGO Act, and government statements started to focus on 
“harmful nongovernmental-organizations” that have been funded by Mr. Soros. Pal Vorner, 
Parliamentary State Secretary of Ministry of Justice, said that civil society organizations that 
criticize the new law do not keep in mind the country’s interests (Magyaroszag Kormanya, 
2017b), after several civil society organizations initiated a peaceful protest against the Foreign 
NGO Act in April 12, 2017. By the end of the month, Prime Minister Orban mentioned that 
special legislation is necessary for NGOs, because “we want to see them, want to know them 
and we want to know who they are financially supported by, otherwise we cannot defend 
Hungary from them.” (Magyaroszag Kormanya, 2017c). The creation of a common enemy by the 
government led to negative public opinion regarding foreign-funded NGOs, especially those who 
work in the areas of government transparency and human rights. 
The government started to concentrate on the “Soros-organizations,” those 
organizations that are directly or indirectly funded by Mr. Soros, and those that have actively 
participated in providing services during the peak of the migration crisis in Hungary. In May 
2017, Parliamentary State Secretary Volner said that immigration organizations attacked 
Hungary in all sorts of ways in accordance with the instructions of Mr. Soros. Further, 
                                                            
7 George Soros (1930-) is one of the world’s foremost philanthropists. Mr. Soros founded the Soros Fund 
Management, LLC in 1969 and has worked as a hedge fund investor in the United States. In the 1970s, Mr. 
Soros began his global philanthropy, and since the 1980s he helped promote cross-border education, civil 
society and the combat against discrimination in Hungary. He established the Hungarian Soros Foundation 
(later part of the Open Society Foundations) and founded the Central European University in Budapest, 
Hungary.  In 2018, after almost 35 years of operation, the Open Society Foundation’s Budapest office 
announced to move their operations and staff to Berlin, Germany because of the worsening political 
environment. 
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Parliamentary State Secretary Volner claimed that attacking the Law on Transparency of 
Organizations Receiving Foreign Funds is just one of Soros-funded NGOs’ “routine tactics” to 
criticize the Hungarian government (Magyaroszag Kormanya, 2017d). Several statements were 
released, where NGOs were identified as collaborators of the migration crisis and human 
trafficking in order to support the necessity of the Foreign NGO Act. 
The government statements as well as the government-related studies published by 
Szazadveg Foundation clearly shows how the reasoning that supports the necessity of Foreign 
NGO Acts has changed through the examined time period. While in January the main reason was 
to enhance transparency and accountability among CSOs in general, in February the focus was 
on NGOs that are active in lobbying activities. However, the emphasis on international and 
foreign-funded NGOs became more conspicuous, especially after the Szazadveg Foundation 
released its survey stating that the Hungarian population does not trust foreign-funded NGOs. 
The government started to make clear differences between NGOs and CSOs, and on April 1, 
2017 the Hungarian Government launched a national consultation (“Let’s Stop Brussels”).  One 
of the questions of the consultation was related to foreign-funded organizations, aka NGOs: 
 
“More and more foreign-supported organizations operate in Hungary 
with the aim of interfering in the internal affairs of our country in an opaque 
manner. These organizations could jeopardize our independence. What do you 
think Hungary should do? (a) Require them to register, revealing the objectives 
of their activities and the sources of their finances. (b) Allow them to continue 
their risky activities without any supervision.” 
 
By May 31, 1,688,044 people had sent back the survey, which was a record high 
participation rate in the history of national consultations introduced by the current government 
in 2010 (Website of the Hungarian Government, 2017o). According to the results published by 
the Hungarian government, the majority of respondents supported the government to require 
NGOs to register, revealing the objectives of their activities and the sources of their finances.  
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As the proposed legislation garnered international attention, Hungarian leaders 
frequently mentioned the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act as the basis for the Hungarian 
proposal. Simultaneously, the so-called Soros-rhetoric had been increasing, and Mr. Soros, the 
“illegal migration-business” and NGOs were often associated to each other. Within six months 
the government changed its reasoning from enhancing accountability and transparency in the 
civil sector to fighting against foreign-funded – mainly “Soros-funded” – NGOs that are 
threatening Hungary and Hungarian politics.  
The Parliament made a decision to invite the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe8 to comment on the draft law on foreign-funded NGOs. Its preliminary opinion, 
published on June 2, 2017, noted that the Draft Law “pursues legitimate aim of ensuring 
transparency of civil society organizations [and] may also contribute to the fight against money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism” (Venice Commission, 2017c, Art. 62). However, the 
Commission also acknowledged that “the neutral label ‘organization receiving support from 
abroad’ used in the draft, placed in the context of a virulent campaign carried out by some 
Hungarian authorities against foreign-funded NGOs, risks to adversely affect their legitimate 
activities and may raise a concern of discriminatory treatment” (Venice Commission, 2017a).  
The Venice Commission also raised four main concerns regarding the reporting and 
labeling requirements as well as the deregistration procedure proposed by the Foreign NGO Act 
(Venice Commission, 2017c, Art. 63):  
 
- The rationale behind the exclusion of a number of associations and 
organizations from the scope of application of the Draft law is not entirely 
clear; 
                                                            
8 The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, or officially the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law, is the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters. The role of the Venice 
Commission is “to provide legal advice to its member states and, in particular, to help states wishing to 
bring their legal and institutional structures into line with European standards and international 
experience in the fields of democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Venice Commission, 2017b). 
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- The period of three years during which a civil society organization may not 
receive any foreign funding in order to be entitled to initiate a 
deregistration procedure is quite long and appears arbitrary; 
- The data included in the register and made public should be limited to the 
major sponsors in order to ensure that no excessive obligation is imposed 
on organizations receiving foreign funding; 
- The obligation that the relevant organization should mention that it 
qualifies as an organization receiving support from abroad on all its press 
products and publication appears to be excessive. 
 
Finally, the Commission recommended to the Hungarian government that a public 
consultation inviting all civil society organizations be conducted before the Hungarian 
Parliament discussed the final adoption of the law. 
Despite the fact that the Venice Commission stated that transparency of civil society 
organizations could support the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism; 
these aims became questionable for the following reasons. First, the Hungarian Parliament 
enacted the new Anti-money Laundering Act in May 2017 in order to comply with the European 
Union’s legislative obligation, but, even though the law became stricter, its scope was not 
extended to civil society organizations. Second, the Hungarian parliament felt the need to create 
and enact a new law focusing on CSOs’ transparency and accountability, but the findings of the 
Venice Commission clearly shows that the draft law was targeting only NGOs in an excessive 
way.  
The experts of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
accentuated the fact that financial transparency of CSOs is already ensured by the Civil Act and 
the Government Decree 50/2011 (XII. 30) on Certain Issues of CSO Financial Management, 
Fundraising and Public Benefit Status and urged the Hungarian government to withdraw the 
draft law because it would “severely curtail the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association in Hungary” (OHCHR, 2017). Despite the domestic and 
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international concerns raised against the draft law, the Foreign NGO Act – with some 
modifications – was adopted in June, 2017. 
3.3.3. Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad  
On June 13, 2017, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the Act LXXVI of 2017 on the 
Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad (Foreign NGO Act) with minor 
changes in accordance with the preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission. This subsection 
briefly discusses the Act, focusing on its controversial sections. The opposition parties submitted 
several amendments to the law that were in line with the Venice Commission’s preliminary 
opinion, but the ruling government party voted against all amendments presented by the 
opposition. The Law on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad was 
adopted by 130 votes to 44, with 24 abstentions. The government party, FIDESZ - KDNP 
coalition, typically has 133 votes in the Parliament (orszaggyules.hu, 2017), and there was not 
one opposition party vote to support the Foreign NGO Act. 
The Foreign NGO Act justifies the need for such a law based on three reasons: special 
public interest, the possibility of endangering the political and economic interests of the 
country, and the prevention of money laundering. According to the language of the law, 
“transparency of these organizations is of special public interest due to the societal engagement 
of associations and foundations” and these organizations might “endanger the political, 
economic interests of the country as well as the operation of statutory institutions” and 
participate in “money laundering”. The Act creates a new legal category of “organizations 
receiving foreign funding” for associations and foundations which receive foreign funding that 
exceeds HUF 7,200,000 (US$ 29,000) (Article 1). Article 1.4 states that the Act shall not apply to 
associations and foundations which are not regarded as civil society organizations, nor sport 
associations, associations pursuing religious activities, or ethnic minority organizations or 
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political parties. This section clearly shows that the Act does not aim to increase the 
transparency of the whole civil sector, and it is not clear why sport, religious and ethnic 
organizations - or particularly, political parties - are less likely to endanger the political or 
economic interest of the country or participate in financing of terrorism than other 
organizations. 
Article 2 states that organizations receiving foreign funding shall declare, within 15 days, 
that they have become organizations receiving foreign funds to the competent Regional Court 
and disclose their status of “organization supported abroad” immediately in their online and 
printed materials. The Foreign NGO Act was to be enforced on the 8th day following its 
publication (June 19, 2017). Therefore the time-period of the implementation of the Act was 
extremely short, and created administrative burdens for these organizations.  
Due to the preliminary opinion of the Venice Commission, several amendments were 
approved regarding the legislation. The data that organizations receiving foreign funds need to 
declare and make public has been limited to major sponsors who donate HUF 500,000 
(US$ 2,000) or more (Article 2.3) instead of all donations independently of the amount. The 
sanction system became more proportionate and it does not include the possibility of automatic 
dissolution of the organization as it was framed in the draft law (Article 3); and the time period 
during which an organization may not receive any foreign funding in order to be entitled to 
initiate a deregistration procedure was decreased to 1 year from 5 years (Article 4).  
According to the Annex no.1 to the Act, the data organizations receiving foreign funds 
need to submit are the following: sum per transaction and the exact source (in case of the 
donation exceeds HUF 500,000 (US$ 2,000)) which might negatively affect cross-border 
donations in Hungary. Furthermore, as the term “support from abroad” is not clearly defined, 
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the Act has created uncertainty among donors as well as NGOs in terms of reporting and 
labeling requirements.  
The European Center for Not-for-Profit Law drew attention to five concerns in relation 
to the Foreign NGO Act including the relatively high fines and possible dissolution of civil society 
organization if they fail to register and meet the requirements, and negative consequences of 
the new categorization and labelling of foreign-funded organizations (ECNL, 2017). In order to 
protest against stigmatizing any group of civil society organizations, several civil society 
organizations, including the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and the Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union declared a boycott against the law while Amnesty International Hungary stated that they 
planned to bring the case to the Constitutional Court on the same day the law was adopted by 
the Parliament (hvg.hu, 2017).  
3.3.4. Intensifying negative government campaign, legal consequences, and an opaque future  
As the Foreign NGO Act was adopted, the negative campaign against NGOs has 
continued and focused more on the so-called undemocratic, Soros-funded NGOs. Peter Szijjarto, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated that NGOs have “never been elected to do anything, 
and accordingly the image that they are representing society in face of the government is a false 
one” (Website of The Hungarian Government. 2017k). Mr. Trocsanyi, Minister of Justice argued 
that civil disobedience is not recognized by the Hungarian legal system (Magyaroszag Kormanya, 
2017e) in response to the boycott initiated by several foreign-funded civil society organizations 
as a response to the adoption of the Foreign NGO Act. Prime Minister Orban also discussed the 
foreign NGO Act during his usual radio interview. He not only questioned the concerns raised by 
the Venice Commission, the governments of Germany and the United States of America, but 
repeatedly highlighted that the United States of America has much stricter regulations – not 
mentioning the laws or decrees directly - for foreign-funded organizations. Prime Minister 
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Orban characterized these American regulations as “harsh,” and “several times stricter” than 
the Hungarian regulation. (Website of The Hungarian Government. 2017m)  
On June, 20 the Venice Commission released its Opinion on The Draft Law on The 
Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad. The Venice Commission 
underlined that the language against foreign-funded civil society organizations that were used 
during the national consultation (“Let’s Stop Brussels”) can harm the reputation and activities of 
such organizations. Although Hungary did not choose to use the stigmatizing term of “foreign 
agent” in its legislation as it appears in the Russian and Israeli legislation, the negative campaign 
using the term “foreign-funded NGOs” connoted political interference, illegal immigration, and 
undemocratic organizations that might lead to the same result as using the term “foreign 
agent”: stigmatization and negative public image of NGOs. The Commission raised concern that 
the Hungarian government avoided any public consultation that might have included civil 
society organizations. The Commission maintained its concerns published previously, on June 2, 
2017. Even though the Commission recognized that “some of these amendments represent an 
important improvement,” it underscored that “some other concerns were not addressed and 
the amendments do not suffice to alleviate the Venice Commission’s concerns that the Law will 
cause disproportionate and unnecessary interference with the freedoms of association and 
expression, the right to privacy, and the prohibition of discrimination” (Venice Commission, 
2017d, Art. 68.) The Venice Commission acknowledged that the law was constitutional in nature, 
but identified the interference with the freedom of association as their main concern with the 
regulation (Fundamental Law of Hungary, Section VIII).  
After June, the government’s communication slightly changed and became more 
negative, using terms like “Soros-funded organizations” and “mafia-like network.” Prime 
Minister Orban said that these organizations are “financed by George Soros …; [t]hey support 
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activities related to the illegal crossing of borders, and they rescue criminals and terrorists.” 
(Website of The Hungarian Government. 2017j). The government issued communication that 
accused the NGOs that protested against the Foreign NGO Act of wanting the government to 
stop controlling the Southern borders. These statements were never proved by the government, 
however the stigmatization of NGOs was increasing as NGOs became painted as anti-
government organizations that might jeopardize the safety and stability of the country. 
In July of 2017, the National Election Committee refused the proposal for a referendum 
submitted by Barnabas Kadar, an opposition party board member, regarding the annulation of 
the Foreign NGO Act. The opposition party was stigmatized as a Soros-related party, who 
worked to prevent transparency of “pro-migration organizations” (origo.hu, 2017). On 
November 8, the Curia, the highest judicial authority in Hungary, reviewed the proposal and 
deemed it to be valid. Therefore the opposition party had 120 days to collect 200,000 signatures 
in order to hold a national referendum in the question.  
Meanwhile, the Hungarian government launched a new national consultation (“About 
The Soros-Plan”) in October 2017. Even though the consultation focused on the so-called Soros-
plan, one of the questions mentioned the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and Amnesty 
International Hungary, as Soros-funded organizations that assist immigration and defend 
migrants who have committed unlawful acts (Question 5, National Consultation about The 
Soros-Plan):  
 
“George Soros would also like to see migrants receive lighter sentences 
for the crimes they commit. George Soros, with significant amounts of funding, 
supports numerous organizations that assist immigration and defend 
immigrants who have committed unlawful acts. One example, the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee, with regard to the prohibited crossing of the border argued 
that ‘the application of strict legal consequences with regard to unlawful entry 
may be considered concerning”. Another Soros organization, Amnesty 
International, on several occasions demanded the release of the Ahmed H., who 
attacked Hungarian police defending the border with rocks and was convicted 
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for this reason. Amnesty would even have the Hungarian state pay 
compensation.”  
 
On October 1, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee went to court because the “misleading 
statements of the national Consultation questionnaire that misrepresents facts” violates the 
organization’s right to good reputation (Helsinki Committee, 2017a). The Hungarian Helsinki 
Commission drew attention to the fact that the truncated citation was moved from one of their 
studies without any context. Bence Tuzson, Minister of State for Government Communication 
stated that the Helsinki Committee was only trying “to restrict the freedom of the Hungarian 
people to express their views” and framed the lawsuit as another attack from “the Soros 
empire.” The government refused to make any correction as Mr. Tuzson underlined that “the 
Hungarian Government is continuing to stand up for the National Consultation, Hungary’s 
interests and the freedom of the Hungarian people to express their opinions” (Website of The 
Hungarian Government. 2017l). Thus, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee asked for an interim 
measure before the judgement that requires the defendant (Cabinet Office) to suspend any 
activity that may be presumed to cause irreversible damage to the plaintiff during the lawsuit. 
The Budapest Court of Appeal decided to implement the interim procedure to suspend the 
dissemination of the statement referring to the Helsinki Committee in Question 5, but planned 
to implement the suspension on November 29, two days before the national consultation 
officially ended (Helsinki Committee, 2017b). Therefore, despite the interim procedure, the 
Hungarian public became misinformed by the government. According to the results of the 
national consultation, more than 2.3 million Hungarian citizens did not agree with question 5, 
rejecting this “particular point of the Soros plan” (nemzetikonzultacio.kormany.hu, 2018). This 
data shows that the general public discourse has a negative attitude towards foreign-funded 
NGOs, and they might associate NGOs with organizations that aim to threaten the Hungarian 
sovereignty by representing the illegal immigration-related “Soros-plan.” 
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The government’s communication changed again after the adaptation of the Foreign 
NGO Act, featuring that such regulation is needed because: 
- NGOs are not democratically elected, but they aim to influence the political arena in 
Hungary;  
- NGOs, especially those that are part of the “Soros empire,” are dangerous to Hungary’s 
sovereignty. 
The negative government campaign with the purpose of undermining the legitimacy of any 
Soros-related individuals and organizations is not clear except for the fact that – according to 
the Hungarian government – Mr. Soros supports illegal immigration and interference in 
Hungarian politics. 
Besides the increasing tension at the national level, the European Union also paid 
particular attention to the Foreign NGO Act. On July 13, 2017, The European Commission - the 
executive arm of the European Union - launched infringement procedure9 for the Law on the 
Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad, sending a letter of formal notice 
to Hungary. During the European Union’s infringement procedure, First Vice-President Frans 
                                                            
9 According to the European Union’s treaties, the European Commission may take legal action – the 
infringement procedure – against a European Union Member State that fails to implement the European 
Union law. The steps of an infringement procedures are the followings: 1) the Commission sends a letter 
of formal notice requesting further information to the country concerned, which must send a detailed 
reply within a specified period, usually 2 months; 2) if the Commission concludes that the country is failing 
to fulfil its obligations under EU law, it may send a reasoned opinion: a formal request to comply with EU 
law. It explains why the Commission considers that the country is breaching EU law. It also requests that 
the EU country inform the Commission of the measures taken, within a specified period, usually 2 
months; 3) if the EU country still doesn't comply, the Commission may decide to refer the matter to the 
Court of Justice. Most cases are settled before being referred to the Court; 4) if an EU county fails to 
communicate measures that implement the provisions of a directive in time, the Commission may ask the 
Court to impose penalties; and 5) if the Court finds that a country has breached EU law, the national 
authorities must take action to comply with the Court judgment (European Commission, 2017a). Despite 
the fact that it is a significant formal procedure, the Court of Justice can impose only financial penalties in 
case of non-compliance. In 2017, there were 482 active cases initiated by the European Commission. 
(Please see at: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-
proceedings/infringement_decisions/?lang_code=en.) 
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Timmermans said: “We have studied the new law on NGOs carefully and have come to the 
conclusion that it does not comply with EU law” in three main areas: the law interferes the right 
to freedom of associations, the law introduces unjustified and disproportionate restrictions to 
the free movement of capital, and the law also raises concern in terms of the right to protection 
of private life and of personal data (European Commission, 2017b). The Hungarian government 
responded to the European Commission, and its official document stated that the restrictions 
that were objected by the European Commission are necessary and proportionate in the Foreign 
NGO Act (kormany.hu, 2017r).  
As a second step in the infringement procedure, the European Union issued a reasoned 
opinion on October 4, where the Commission confirmed that they “had decided to start a legal 
proceeding against Hungary for failing to fulfil its obligations under the [European Union] Treaty 
provision” (European Commission, 2017c). The European Commission argued that the Foreign 
NGO Act was indirectly discriminative and disproportionately restricted charitable contributions 
from abroad that offend the free movement of capital within the European Union. On October 
5, Janos Lazar, Minister of Prime Minister's Office said regarding the infringement procedure 
that “they (the Hungarian government) are not planning to amend the law. … It transpires from 
the report (conducted by Hungary’s Permanent Representation in Brussels) that the Hungarian 
NGO legislation prescribes obligations for non-governmental organizations operating here which 
the European Commission itself has employed for years.” (Magyaroszag Kormanya, 2017f). 
Despite the government’s argument, the study referred to in the statement cannot be accessed, 
and the Hungarian government did not specify the regulations. Finally, the European 
Commission referred Hungary to the Court of Justice for its Foreign NGO Act on December 7 
after concluding that “its serious concerns had not been addressed” by Hungary as the 
Hungarian government was given one month to take the necessary amendments to meet the 
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European Union regulations (European Commission, 2017d). As of June 2018, the Court of 
Justice is in the process of examining the case of Hungary related to its Foreign NGO Act. 
To conclude, the Hungarian government adopted an anti-foreign NGO law without 
thorough public/inter-sectoral consultation or political consensus that is often expected before 
enacting new laws. Further, the law is discriminative and therefore cannot serve anti-money 
laundering purposes within the civil sector. The government’s communication has changed 
through the year 2016 as the purpose and importance of the law evolved: early arguments 
focused on increasing the civil sector’s transparency and accountability, then shifted to 
preventing the “illegal operation” of Soros-funded organizations that threaten the country’s 
sovereignty and national security. Even though several national and international organizations 
raised their voices against the law for being unconstitutional and discriminative, there were no 
real effect on the legislation. The negative government campaign has continued from the 
adaption of the law and even though Hungary does not use the term “foreign agent” to 
stigmatize their NGOs, the term NGO and foreign-funded organizations have gained a negative 
connotation in the public discourse. Thus, the Foreign NGO Act adopted and implemented by 
the Hungarian government could negatively influence NGO’s ability to raise and receive both 
domestic and cross-border donations, and public trust towards the civil sector in general has 
likely been damaged in the process.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTIES SUPPORTED BY FOREIGN 
STATE ENTITIES LAW, 5776-2016 
Israel is the other OECD country whose government recently passed an anti-foreign 
NGO law in order to tighten restrictions on foreign-funded nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). Freedom House considered Israel’s freedom status as “free” in 2017, but the rating for 
civil liberties decreased due to the laws that have been proposed and implemented to restrict 
the operation of NGOs and their access to cross-border funding (Freedom House, 2018b). Israel 
scored higher than Hungary – 79 and 72 respectively in a score system where 0 represents “the 
least free” and 100 “the most free” countries studied in the report however both countries are 
characterized by a less free environment for civil liberties (Freedom House, 2018c). In Israel, 
NGOs receiving charitable contributions from foreign state entities have been under attack by 
the government since 2011 and targeted by the Transparency Requirements for Parties 
Supported by Foreign State Entities Law, 5777-2016, which was enacted in 2016. Israel was the 
first OECD country that passed a foreign agents regulation, claiming that the law was inspired by 
the 1938 FARA, though according to Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked “the requirements … are less 
stringent that those imposed by the United States upon similar types of activity” (Shaked, 2016). 
This chapter discusses the Israeli anti-foreign NGO law in order to provide a detailed 
picture about the environment of the Israeli civil society and the possible impacts of the law. 
First, the development and crucial role of Israeli civil sector is discussed briefly, focusing on the 
time period from 1970 to the present. Then, the chapter will explore the regulations that aim to 
increase CSO transparency and accountability, highlighting the disproportionate regulations that 
apply to NGOs receiving funding from foreign government entities. The current legislation, the 
transparency Requirements for Parties Supported by Foreign State Entities Law, 5776-2016, is 
examined afterwards, and it explains how government statements and several amendments led 
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to enact the final version of the law. Finally, the chapter catalogues the responses that 
international entities to the new Israeli law, especially the statements made by the United 
Nations and the European Union. 
In Israel, the term “civil society organization” includes associations, public benefit 
companies and public benefit foundations, associations, public benefit organizations and other 
organizations established under the right of associations (Amutot Law, 5740-1980, the 
Companies Law, 5759-1999). Similarly to Hungary, the term nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) has often been used to connote foreign-funded civil society organizations. Therefore, 
the chapter uses these terms accordingly: CSOs are registered organizations under the Israeli 
legislation, while NGOs are those foreign-funded CSOs that became primarily targeted by the 
2016 Israeli Foreign NGO Act.  
4.1. The Israeli nonprofit sector 
Since the 1970s, civil society has become a significant part of Israel’s history, including 
the formation of the basic economic and social policies (Gidron et al.,1999). Katz and Greenspan 
(2015) describe the current age of Israeli civil society as the pluralist era. During the pluralist era, 
from the mid-1970s to the present, civil society has grown as the Israeli government were 
challenged by economic, political, and social changes. As the roles and responsibilities of the 
civil society became more relevant, legal institutions were created to regulate the sector. In 
1980, the Israeli Knesset adopted the Amutot Law, 5740-1980, otherwise known as the Law on 
Associations and in 1977, the Companies Law, 5759-1999 was enacted to regulate public benefit 
companies and public benefit foundations. Additionally, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights – signed by the Israeli government in 1966, but ratified only in 1992 – guarantees 
the freedom of peaceful assembly, expression and association (Article 21). 
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The Amutot Law established the legal framework of associations and regulates their 
registration, operation, and reporting requirements.  According to the law, an amuta, or 
association, needs to be registered at the Registrar of Amutot, however the registration can be 
declined if any of the association’s objectives are against the existence or democratic character 
of the State of Israel (Amutot Law, Article 3). Additionally, an amuta cannot use a name that is 
likely to mislead or offend public policy or the feelings of the public (Amutot Law, Article 4). The 
Amutot Law, as a transparency and monitoring tool, also requires associations to file several 
reports to the Registrar of Amutot, including their annual financial report (Amutot Law, Article 
38). The Companies Law regulates public benefit companies and public benefit foundations. It 
also states that the objectives of a company or foundation cannot be immoral or in conflict with 
the public (Companies Law, Article 2) and that the organizations under this law also need to 
submit their annual financial report to the Companies Registrar (Companies Law, Article 141). It 
is important to review the requirements of the these laws to establish the fact that ensuring 
transparency of NGOs, one of the most important reasons for the new foreign agents 
registration act in 2016, is already clearly and thoroughly addressed by the Amutot Law and the 
Companies Law. However, the regulations on registration and incorporation do not create clear 
frameworks and the use of terms such as the “democratic character of the State of Israel” or 
“immoral objectives” that are subject to interpretation. The Israeli government can therefore 
dispute the legality any left-wing or pro-Palestinian organization by positing that the goals of 
such organizations are “immoral” because they go against official government mandates. 
Israel has one of the largest civil society sectors in relation to its economy with more 
than 600,000 registered CSOs (Gidron et al.,1999, Einolf, 2015, p. 514-515.). By the year 1995, 
CSOs produced 5.6% of the Israeli GDP providing employment for 13.2% of the national 
workforce (Gidron et al.,1999). As a comparison, American CSOs produced 6.9% of the United 
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States’ GDP and provided 7.8% of the national employment, while the Hungarian results were 
much lower, 2.8% and 1.3% respectively in the same year (Salamon et al., 1999). According to 
the comparative research on 22 countries’ civil society sectors, conducted by Salamon and his 
colleagues (1999), the average of the GDP contribution of the sector was 4.6% and the level of 
employment reached 4.8% in 1995, excluding volunteers. The most important subsectors of 
Israeli philanthropy are children and youth, food security, and health (Katz and Greenspan, 
2015, p. 329). The data of registered Israeli CSOs are sometimes different and often incomplete 
because of the inadequate data collection, but according to the Registrar of Associations, the 
number of registered associations increased by more than 50% between 2004 and 2012 (Limor, 
2004 and 2012). However, as civil society has developed, the Israeli government tried to 
increase government supervision and limit the operation of civil society organizations. The 
National Council for Volunteerism and the Aridor Committee, both established by the Office of 
the Prime Minister, were created to increase the government control over the Israeli civil 
society (Katz and Greenspan, 2015). 
Since the 1970s, not only has Israeli civil society increased, but also the Jewish Diaspora 
became an important actor and influencer of the Israeli nonprofit sector through cross-border 
charitable contributions. Diaspora philanthropy shaped the economic and social welfare of the 
state from the beginning (Bubis, 1969) and it remained significant in intervening decades. Israel 
is the only developed nation in which imports exceed exports of charitable contributions (Gidron 
et al., 2003). The importance of donations coming from foreign private foundations or 
individuals is shown on the Transparency Law, as only CSOs that receive donations from foreign 
state entities became subject to the legislation, although the regulation aimed to increase 
transparency and accountability among foreign-funded NGOs. 
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In the 2000s, the Israeli government started to strengthen the collaboration with CSOs. 
The Ministry of Social Welfare and later the Prime Minister’s Office initiated several 
conversations to nourish the relationship between the public and nonprofit sectors. In 2008, the 
Israeli government acknowledged the sector and its contribution to Israeli society and started to 
host round-table discussions between government ministries, civil society organizations and 
businesses in order to create a more enabling environment for the nonprofit sector that 
continued to grow both economically and in terms of size (Almog-Bar, 2016). In the same year, 
the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office published a report titled Government of Israel, The Civil 
Society, and The Business Community: Partnership, Empowerment, and Transparency. In this 
report, the government stated numerous goals, such as creating a platform for ongoing cross-
sectoral dialogues, cooperating with CSOs in forming social service policies and implementing 
them, and increasing the level of transparency and accountability of the sector (Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2008). The collaboration with CSOs – primarily with domestic, pro-government CSOs – 
seemed to be flourishing as round-table discussions and collaborations were initiated in fields 
such as public education.  
While the relationship with domestic, pro-government CSOs has been improving, with 
many such organizations receiving public and governmental recognition (Almog-Bar, 2016 p. 
253), that has not been the case with foreign-funded NGOs supporting human rights or the pro-
Palestinian agenda. The Israeli-Palestinian relationship remained turbulent through the last 
several decades, and therefore, organizations supporting anything that was not in step with the 
Israeli government’s agenda have been oppressed by soft policies and regulations. The Israeli 
government has often used the media to associate such organizations with anti-Israeli or 
terrorist organizations and enacted new regulations to closely surveille them.  
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4.2. Israeli laws to enhance NGO transparency and prevent money laundering 
Israel implemented anti-money laundering legislation in 2000, anti-terrorist financing 
legislation in 2005, and counter-terrorism legislation in 2016 in accordance to the 
recommendations established by the Financial Action Task Force. The Prohibition on Money 
Laundering Law, 5760-2000, regulates primarily financial institutions and individuals including 
banks, money service providers, stock exchange members and portfolio managers, and dealers 
of precious stones. In 2014, the most recent amendment of the law extended its reach beyond 
explicitly financial institutions. The new amendment required that other professionals such as 
lawyers and accountants identify and register relevant information regarding their clients’ 
financial or business transactions (Levush, 2014). 
Even though NGOs’ operations and accountability have been regulated in separate laws, 
these laws have impacted the NGOs as well. Based on the 1945 Defense (Emergency) 
Regulations, the Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law 5765-2004, the Declarations on Terrorist 
Organizations in accordance with the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance No. 33 5708-1948, and 
the Counter Terrorism Law 2016, the Israeli Government can declare organizations to be 
terrorist organizations, while the Ministry of Defense was given the authority to decide which 
organizations are unauthorized associations and illegal (Ministry of Defense, 2018a). According 
to the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations, organizations, whether incorporated or 
unincorporated, are unauthorized associations if they recommend, instigate, or encourage in 
their constitution or propaganda one of the following immoral actions (Article 84): 
 
- abrogation of the constitution of Israel or the Government of Israel by force 
or violence; 
- causing Holocaust, contempt or incitement to hostility towards, the 
Government of Israel or its Ministers in their official capacity; 
- destruction or damage to the property of the Government of Israel; 
- acts of terrorism directed against the Government of Israel or against its 
employees. 
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Between 2010 and 2017, 94 organizations were declared as unauthorized associations 
or terrorist organizations and their property was confiscated by the Israeli government (Ministry 
of Defense, 2018b). Several organizations were pro-Palestinian, but the list also includes 
international aid and human rights organizations such as the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights 
Monitor registered in Switzerland, or International Kandil Institute for Humanitarian Aid and 
Development registered in Turkey. 
The transparency and accountability of NGOs have been regulated since 2008 when the 
government amended the Amutot Law to make reporting requirements stricter for NGOs. In 
2008, besides the general annual reporting requirements, NGOs were required to publish all 
revenues coming from foreign government entities on their websites. In 2011, the Law on 
Disclosure Requirements for Recipients of Support from a Foreign State Entity, 5771-2011 
(Foreign Funding Law) was enacted. The Foreign Funding Law required associations and public 
benefit companies to quarterly report the donations received from foreign state entities with an 
aggregate value over NIS 20,000 (USD 5,800) to the Registrar. In addition, associations and 
public benefit companies were required to disclose in relevant campaign materials if the 
donations from foreign government entities explicitly provided for public information campaigns 
(Foreign Funding Law Articles 1 and 2, Schriber et al, 2010, European Union, 2016). Based on the 
Amutot Law, 5740-1980, foreign state entities include a union, organization or association of 
foreign states; an organization, authority or representation of a foreign state or of a union of 
foreign states; a local or district authority, a government authority of a foreign state or of a state 
that is a member of a union of states in a foreign state; a union, organization or association of 
foreign bodies; the Palestinian Authority; and a corporate body established by regulations of 
one of the bodies detailed above (Article 36A). Thus, donations coming from the European 
Union, the United Nations, or other intergovernmental organizations need to be reported. 
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Associations and public benefit companies whose financial turnover exceeds NIS 300,000 (USD 
86,600) must state in their Financial Statement whether they received donations from a foreign 
state entity in the reported year (Schriber et al, 2010). 
The reporting requirements can be burdensome, as organizations need to fulfill their 
quarterly reporting, in addition to their general reporting requirements. The reporting 
requirements for foreign funding include the identity of the donor; the amount of the support; 
the goals or designation of the support; and the conditions of the support, including 
undertakings made by the recipient of support to the foreign state entity regarding the support, 
orally or in writing, directly or indirectly, if such exist (Foreign Funding Law, Article 2). Every 
amuta whose financial turnover exceeds NIS 300,000, must state in the Financial Statement 
whether it has received donations from “a Foreign State Entity” (see definition below) in the 
year to which the Statement relates.  
Despite the aim of enhancing transparency and accountability for NGOS, this legislation 
has been challenged as it focuses only on cross-border donations coming from foreign states or 
state entities. Additionally, the Foreign Funding Law does not apply for the World Zionist 
Organization, the Jewish Agency for Israel, Keren Hayesod – United Israel Appeal, and the Jewish 
National Fund, as well as corporations controlled by these organizations. These exceptions 
might strengthen critics that state that this legislation has aimed to undermine the operation of 
pro-Palestinian and human rights organizations instead of to enhance the transparency of the 
nonprofit sector. 
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4.3. Foreign-funded NGOs under government attack 
4.3.1. Government statements and amendments related to foreign-funded NGOs 
From 2011 several members of the Knesset submitted amendments regarding foreign-
funded NGOs to increase transparency and ensure the Israeli national security (The Association 
for Civil Rights in Israel, 2016). In 2013, Ayelet Shaked, Member of the Knesset introduced a law 
that sought to impose taxes on all donations from foreign state entities to Israeli NGOs that 
support certain actions such as boycotts, sanctions against Israel, or calling for the prosecution 
of Israeli soldiers at international tribunal. In 2014, Miri Regev, Member of the Knesset, 
introduced an amendment to the Amutot Law that stated that the government can deny the 
registration of any NGOs if any of its objectives contradict the definition of “Israel as a Jewish 
and democratic state.” However, the foreign-funded NGOs that have been affected by this law 
primarily provide human rights services (Yesh Din, 2018), promote cultural and educational 
activities (The Arab Culture Association, 2018), or support peaceful religious activities (Lis, 
2016). 
In 2015, the government released a proposed bill that required representatives of 
foreign-funded NGOs to wear a special identification tag. Despite the enhancement of 
transparency, these proposed amendments and laws show that the Knesset and the Israeli 
government have been willing to regulate and scrutinize NGOs that represent views and values 
that are contradictory with the Israeli government. Furthermore, from 2015 onwards, numerous 
proposed amendments sought to stigmatize foreign-funded NGOs, but only those that do not 
cooperate with the government (The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2016). 
While new amendments and draft bills were proposed, government statements 
regarding the necessity of such amendments were also increasing. The Israeli government’s two 
main arguments were that the proposed legislation increased transparency and the protection 
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of state sovereignty, “as these organizations have no obligation of proper disclosure, in which 
they have to present themselves as clearly representing foreign interests that do not accord 
with Israeli interests”(Lis, 2014). Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked said that “foreign funding of 
organizations active within Israel undermine [the state’s] sovereignty and identity” (Lis, 2015). 
These statements clearly show that the government aimed to make NGO operations more 
transparent and protect the sovereignty of Israel through this legislation. Additionally, the Israeli 
government often declared that the amendments are based on the 1938 FARA, but “they are 
much less stringent than those imposed by the United States” (Raday, 2016). 
After the adoption of the Transparency Requirements for Parties Supported by Foreign 
State Entities Law, 5776-2016, Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked claimed that foreign-funded 
organizations meddle in the country’s “internal affairs,” while Prime Minister Netanyahu said 
that the foreign agents regulation “prevents an absurd situation in which foreign countries 
interfere in Israel’s internal affairs” (Eglash and Booth, 2016). These examples shows that the 
government main reasoning has remained the protection of state sovereignty.  
4.3.2. Transparency Requirements for Parties Supported by Foreign State Entities Law, 5776-
2016 
From 2015, the Israeli Government as well as the members of Knesset introduced 
several amendments and bills regarding foreign-funded NGOs: besides the government’s own 
proposal, four individual proposals were submitted by the end of 2015 (The Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel, 2016). On December 27, 2015 the Ministerial Committee approved the 
government’s proposed law as well as two individual amendments.  
The proposal submitted by the government obligated NGOs to disclose that the majority 
of their funding is from foreign state entities in all their publications, to note in their minutes 
and other documents that most of their funding is from foreign state entities, including the 
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names of the countries that such entities represent, and to make their representatives wear a 
special identification tag. Noncompliance of any of the requirements result a fine of NIS 29,200 
(USD 8,400) for each violation. The amendment submitted by Bezalel Smutrich, Member of the 
Knesset, proposed that NGOs that receive majority of their funding from foreign state entities 
be referred to as “organizations funded by foreign agents.” The amendment submitted by Yinon 
Magal, Member of the Knesset, proposed that NGOs that receive more than USD 50,000 from 
foreign countries be referred to as “foreign agents” except for health and education 
organizations. In addition, Mr. Magal’s amendment sought to forbid representatives of such 
organizations from having meetings with any government or security officials, and to tax 
donations received from foreign state entities at an increased rate of 38%, with an exemption 
for those organizations that also receive donations from the Israeli government. These 
proposals suggest that instead of transparency, such legislation would lead to stigmatization of 
foreign-funded NGOs and scrutinize the operation of such NGOs by setting burdensome 
reporting requirements and labelling them negatively. Furthermore, as the Foreign Funding Law 
also made exceptions for pro-government NGOs, Mr. Magal’s amendment would not apply for 
NGOs that receive government funding. 
After several modifications, the final draft of the Transparency Requirements for Parties 
Supported by Foreign State Entities Law, 5776-2016 (Transparency Law) was published on June 
22, 2016 and The Knesset approved it on July 11, 2016. The most important regulations are the 
following: 
 
- organizations that receive 50 percent of their donations from foreign state 
entities must note the fact in all their publication, reports and other 
documents both online and on paper, including letters sent to public 
officials (Article 4 and 5); 
- organizations need to declare the names of foreign state entities that have 
given donations to these NGOs (Article 5); 
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- Representatives of organizations funded by foreign state entities are 
required to inform the chair of any Knesset committee meetings or hearings 
that he/she represents such an organization (Article 5). 
 
The reporting requirements take effect in June 2018, based on funding received since 
January 1 2017. It provided NGOs some time to get ready to meet all the requirements set by 
the law. In case of noncompliance the fine is up to NIS 30,000 (USD 8,700). 
4.3.3. Domestic and international criticism  
Both the domestic and international community raised concerns regarding the negative 
and disproportionate effects that the Transparency Law might have on NGOs. Despite the 
concerns articulated by the opposition party and NGOs affected by the law as well as the 
European Union and international organizations, the law hasn’t been legally challenged since its 
enactment in July 2016. 
During the hearings and after passing the Transparency Law, Israeli NGOs voiced their 
concerns regarding the Law. Since 2015, several politicians from the opposition party and NGO 
leaders addressed their concerns regarding the draft legislation, stating that the legislation could 
be a “symbolic attack on human rights organisations” and a “mark of shame … like a scarlet 
letter for NGOs.” (Rifai, 2015). Before the final vote, Nonprofits Registrar representative Yafit 
Shemer reported to the Knesset committee that the Transparency law would affect only 27 
organizations. Then, the list of NGOs that will be targeted by the law was leaked. According to 
the list, 25 of the 27 targeted organizations were left-wing organizations, most of them focusing 
on human rights issues (Bob, Hoffman, and Harkov, 2016).  
After the enactment of the Transparency Law, representatives of local NGOs criticized 
the law for being biased and leading to the stigmatization of left-wing NGOs. Several criticisms 
underlined the fact that the Transparency Law could lead to the delegitimization of particular 
NGOS rather than the increase of such organizations’ transparency: “[t]he idea behind the bill 
82 
is … public shaming of left-wing NGOs and the attempt to present them as foreign agents;” the 
regulation aims “to silence criticism on government policies;” and it only seeks to “delegitimise 
them (foreign-funded NGOs ) in order to marginalise their impact in the country” (Tahhan, 
2016).  
The Transparency Law could stigmatize left-wing, foreign-funded NGOs rather than 
enhancing transparency in the overall sector. In addition, it is important that the regulation only 
targeted organizations that receive more than 50% of their funding from foreign government 
entities, because left-wing NGOs working for equality, human rights, and peace would be 
disproportionately affected by these new regulations. Meanwhile, right-wing groups and pro-
settler organizations mostly receive foreign funding from private individuals or foundations, and 
therefore they are not fall under the Transparency Law (Strickland, 2016). The Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel stated that this regulation is more like a “redundancy bill” and an “another 
means of harassing and delegitimising human rights organisations in Israel” (Strickland, 2016). 
After enacting the Transparency Law, the international community, including the 
European Union and the United Nations, also raised its concerns regarding its negative and 
disproportionate effects on NGOs. The European Union stated that “the new law goes beyond 
the legitimate need for transparency and seem aimed at constraining the activities of these civil 
society organizations working in Israel” and argued that the law could undermine the values of 
the Israeli civil society, including its diversity and role in maintaining a vibrant democracy in the 
country (European Union External Action, 2016).  
Ban Ki-Moon, then Secretary- General of the United Nations pointed out that the new 
Transparency Law is “increasingly delegitimized” as it mainly targets human rights organizations 
(United Nations Secretary-General, 2016). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) also expressed concerns in connection with the possible threat of 
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delegitimization of human rights and pro-Palestinian organizations, undersoring that the 
legislation could “disproportionately affect non-governmental organizations working on human 
rights and contribute to their de-legitimization” (OHCHR, 2016). Indeed, the OHCHR even used 
an assessment from the Israeli government in its critique: “[w]hile this new law has been 
described as an effort to increase transparency in the NGO sector, it will disproportionately 
affect NGOs working on human rights, as confirmed by recent research undertaken by the Israeli 
Ministry of Justice itself” (UN, 2016). 
The statements from foreign governments and international organizations clearly show 
that, besides using the media to make criticisms widely known in Israel and throughout the 
world, foreign entities are not able to influence the regulations of international philanthropy. 
They expressed their concerns and formed their recommendations, such as calling upon Israel 
“to continue to promote its active NGO sector and to refrain from actions which may complicate 
the space in which civil society organisations operate” (European Union External Action, 2016) 
or “to listen to these extremely valid concerns and take them into consideration” (UN, 2016). 
But instead of spurring new legal changes, such statements often bounced back and seemed to 
serve as a reason for such regulations. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wrote that the law 
aimed "to prevent an absurd situation, in which foreign states meddle in Israel's internal affairs 
by funding NGOs, without the Israeli public being aware of it" (BBC, 2016). Prime Minister 
Netanyahu’s statement implicitly suggests that international criticism of the law may be exactly 
the type of “meddling” by foreign states that the law seeks to guard against.  Thus, such 
international statements without any real actions can be counter-productive when making 
efforts to support the work of international NGOs operating in a less favorable political 
environment.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARISON BETWEEN THE HUNGARIAN AND ISRAELI FOREIGN AFENTS 
REGULATIONS 
Even though Hungary and Israel differ from each other socially, politically, as well as 
economically, several similarities can be identified that lead to the implementation of the 
foreign agents regulations acts. First of all, governments in both countries justified these laws by 
emphasizing the importance of transparency of CSOs and of protecting state sovereignty. 
Second, both governments have argued that they used the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act 
as a model, following in the footsteps of the United States. Additionally, the pieces of legislation 
as well as the negative government propaganda in both countries seem to discriminate and 
stigmatize a certain group of CSOs, namely those who freely criticize the governments’ policies, 
work to support human rights, or espouse any beliefs that run contrary to the governments’. 
This chapter uses “foreign agents regulation” as an umbrella term to refer to the 
Hungarian Law on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad and the 
Israeli Transparency Requirements for Parties Supported by Foreign State Entities Law. Both the 
Hungarian and Israeli governments have argued that the legislation is based on, but not as strict 
as, the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act adopted by the United States of America, therefore 
this term can be seen as a neutral term in order to avoid any prejudice during the analysis and 
comparison. 
5.1. What is the truth about the relationship between the 1938 FARA and the recently adopted 
foreign agents regulations? 
Both the Israeli and Hungarian governments mentioned several times that their 
legislation that placed restrictions on foreign-funded NGOs was based on the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act (FARA) enacted by the United States Congress in 1938. Indeed, both Hungary 
and Israel stated that their own foreign agents regulations are less strict that the one 
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implemented in the United States. This section compares the content of the Hungarian and 
Israeli foreign agents regulations and contrasts them with the 1938 FARA in order to be able to 
objectively analyze the foreign agents regulations and the Hungarian and Israeli governments’ 
communication.  
5.1.1. Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1938 
The FARA was passed in 1938 as the response of U.S. Congress to the increasing German 
propaganda right before World War II. The act aimed to “insure that the U.S. Government and 
the people of the United States are informed of the source of information and the identity of 
persons attempting to influence U.S. public opinion, policy, and law” (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2017a). After the amendments in 1966, the meaning of “foreign agents” was narrowed 
to focus on political lobbying rather than propaganda (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017b). The 
current legislation (22 U.S.C.A. §611 - §621.) requires a relationship between an agent and a 
foreign principal. The agent could be any “individual, partnership, association, corporation, 
organization, or any other combination of individuals” who acts under the direction or control of 
a foreign principal and engages in political activities; acts as a public relations counsel or political 
consultant; solicits, collects, disburses, or dispenses contributions, loans, money; or represents 
the interests of the foreign principal before any agency or official of the Government of the 
United States (22 U.S.C.A. §611.a and c). The foreign principal includes “a government of a 
foreign country and a foreign political party; a person outside of the United States; or a 
partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of persons organized 
under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a foreign country”(22 U.S.C.A. 
§611.b). Finally, it is important to mention that the meaning of “agent of a foreign principal” 
under the FARA has been interpreted with reference to the common law definition of agency. 
Thus, based on the 2006 Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 1.01 (c) the principle-agent 
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relationship occurs when an agent “acts as a representative of or otherwise on behalf of another 
person” and where “[t]he person represented has a right to control the actions of the agent.” 
Indeed, as the Audit of the National Security Division’s Enforcement and Administration of the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act emphasizes it, organizations, such as non-governmental and 
grass roots organizations, that receive funding from foreign governments are not required to 
register under FARA, when they claim that “they act independently of foreign control or are not 
serving a predominantly foreign interest” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2016). 
FARA also includes several activities that are exempt from the requirements of the act 
including private and nonpolitical activities, solicitation of funds and religious, scholastic, or 
scientific pursuits among others. Thus any person who engages in the following activities are not 
required to register under FARA (22 U.S.C.A. §613. d and e): 
 
- “in private and nonpolitical activities in furtherance  of  the  bona  fide  
trade  or  commerce of  such  foreign  principal;”   
- “in other activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest;” 
- “in the soliciting or collecting of funds and contributions within the United 
States to be used only for medical aid and assistance, or for food and 
clothing to relieve human suffering;”  
- “in activities in furtherance of bona fide religious, scholastic, academic, or 
scientific pursuits or of the fine arts.” 
 
In the case that a person does serve as an agent of foreign principle, he must fill out a 
registration statement with the Attorney General;  file two copies of any informational materials 
“disseminated or circulated among two or more persons” to the Attorney General; include a 
statement in any informational material that “the materials are distributed by the agent on 
behalf of the foreign principal;” and if he “appears before any committee of Congress to testify 
for or in the interests of such foreign principal, he shall, at the time of such appearance, furnish 
the committee with a copy of his most recent registration statement filed with the Department 
of Justice as an agent of such foreign principal” (22 U.S.C.A. §614. a, b, and f). Finally, agents of 
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foreign principle need to keep records of their activities and present them in case of public 
examination.  
5.1.2. Comparison between the Hungarian, Israeli, and the U.S. foreign agents regulations 
As mentioned earlier, both the Hungarian and the Israeli governments claim that they 
used the FARA as the basis to create their own foreign agents regulations. This section will 
compare the three regulations by focusing on the following four aspects: the public rationale for 
enacting such regulation, the types of legal persons that are targeted by the regulations, the 
requirements laid out by the legislation for identified and registered “foreign agents,” and the 
time period given to legal persons affected by the regulation to meet the new requirements. 
As Table Three shows, the foreign agents regulations in all three countries were enacted 
to fight against foreign influence that might threaten the national interest and security of the 
countries. Transparency and accountability were key reasons given to enact the law. All 
governments felt that national security had been threatened by different foreign forces: the 
United States was facing an increasing level of Nazi propaganda just before the beginning of 
World War II; Israel had been concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has 
intensified since 2015; and Hungary started the “war” against “illegal immigration” and against 
organizations – often foreign funded ones – that support migrants and refugees in the country 
after the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis that led to an unprecedented influx of refugees arriving to 
Europe. 
In terms of the target group, both the Israeli and the Hungarian regulations’ primary 
group are NGOs (foreign-funded associations and foundations), while FARA does not specifically 
target NGOs. Indeed, receiving funding from foreign entities does not require an NGO to register 
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Table Three: Comparison between the Hungarian, Israeli, and U.S. Foreign Agents Regulations 
Country Hungary Israel United States of 
America 
Legislation Act LXXVI of 2017 on the 
Transparency of 
Organizations Receiving 
Support from Abroad 
Transparency 
Requirements for Parties 
Supported by Foreign 
State Entities Law, 5776-
2016  
Foreign Agent 
Registration Act, 1938 
Target group(s) Organizations (associations 
and foundations) receiving 
foreign funding that exceeds 
HUF 7,200,000 (US$ 29,000) 
Organizations that receive 
50 percent of their 
donations from foreign 
state  
Agent of foreign 
principal 
Exemptions Sport associations; Organizations receiving 
cross-border donations 
from private entities; and  
Private and 
nonpolitical activities, 
solicitation of funds; 
Associations pursuing 
religious activities; 
Organizations receiving 
less than 50 percent of 
their donations from 
foreign state. 
Religious, scholastic, 
or scientific pursuits; 
and 
Ethnic minority organizations; 
and  
  Etc. 
Political parties.     
Level of registration Regional Court  Department of Justice Attorney General 
Reporting and other 
requirements 
Disclose their status of 
“organization supported from 
abroad” immediately on their 
online and printed materials; 
and 
Note the fact that the 
organization is supported 
by a foreign state entity 
all their publication, 
reports and other 
documents both online 
and on paper, including 
letters sent to public 
officials;  
Include a statement in 
any informational 
material that “the 
materials are 
distributed by the 
agent on behalf of the 
foreign principal”; 
Declare the information of 
their major sponsors whom 
donation is HUF 500,000 
(US$ 2,000) or more. 
Declare the names of 
foreign state entities that 
have given donations to 
these NGOs; and  
File two copies of any 
informational 
materials to the 
Attorney General; and 
  Inform the chair of any 
Knesset committee 
meetings or hearings that 
he represent such an 
organization. 
Inform the committee 
of the Congress when 
he testifies for or in 
the interests of such 
foreign principal by 
furnish the committee 
with a copy of his 
most recent 
registration 
statement.  
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Penalties in case of 
noncompliance 
Proportionate sanction 
according to the Act LXXXI of 
2011; and  
Fine up to NIS 30,000 
(USD 8,700) 
Fine up to USD 
10,000, depending on 
the violation; and  
Dissolution, if necessary Temporary or 
permanent injunction, 
restraining order or 
other order issued by 
the district court  
Day the regulation took 
effect 
June 19, 2017 (8 days after 
enactment) 
January 1, 2017 (almost 6 
months after enactment) 
September 6, 1938 
(almost 3 months 
after enactment)  
Reason of enacting such 
regulations 
Transparency; Transparency; and Transparency in case 
of political lobbying; 
and  
Protection of national 
interest; and 
Protection of national 
interest. 
Fight against foreign 
propaganda.  
Fight against money 
laundering.  
    
Sources: Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad; Transparency 
Requirements for Parties Supported by Foreign State Entities Law, 5776-2016; and Foreign Agent Registration Act, 
1938. 
 
as an “agent of foreign principal.” Furthermore, while the Israeli law only targets 
organizations that receive more than 50 percent of their donations from foreign government 
entities, the Hungarian law targets organizations that receive all types of foreign donations of 
HUF 500,000 (USD 2,000) or more including individual, foundation, and governmental 
donations, as well as European Union grants. The Hungarian regulation, as well as the American 
one, provide several exemptions such as religious organizations. The Israeli foreign agents 
regulation have a very narrow target group – affecting the work of only 27 NGOs (Laufer, 
2017)—and raising the question of whether such regulations effectively promote transparency 
in the nonprofit sector. 
After an NGO registers as “foreign agents,” they need to disclose their status in any 
informational materials, both printed and online. The term “foreign agent” is not used by either 
Hungary or Israel, but both governments instead used a related term throughout public 
communications both before and after the enactment of the regulations. In the case of Hungary, 
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the government created a negative connotation for the term, “organization supported from 
abroad;” in the case of Israel, the term “organization supported by a foreign state entity” was 
used by the government in a similar way. Both Hungarian and Israeli NGOs need to declare and 
make public the names of their major foreign donors, which constitutes burdensome 
administrative requirements and, simultaneously, could disincline both foreign and domestic 
donors from supporting such organizations. Even though Hungary does not require NGOs to 
inform parliamentary committees regarding their special status, Israel, as well as the United 
States, require “foreign agents” to do so before their hearings. 
Finally, it is important to consider how much time NGOs had to prepare for the new 
requirements established by the foreign agents regulations in the countries analyzed in this 
study. The Israeli law took effect on January 1, 2017, giving a six-month time period for NGOs to 
get prepared for the new regulations, and the first reporting under the foreign agents regulation 
will happen in June 2018, almost two years after the law passed. The Hungarian law had a much 
shorter adoption period: the Hungarian law entered into force on the 8th day after the law’s 
official publication, creating an extremely short time period for foreign funded NGOs in Hungary 
to comply. It was widely criticized by NGOs as well as the Venice Commission.  
5.2. Stigmatization and delegitimization instead of transparency and public trust 
After receiving criticism from local NGOs and international organizations as well as 
foreign governments, it is important to see how the foreign agents regulations in Hungary and 
Israel have affected the public view towards foreign-funded NGOs operating in these countries. 
The concerns about labeling, stigmatizing, and delegitimizing the operation of NGOs appeared in 
both countries even though the countries do not use the term “foreign agent” to label such 
organizations. 
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In Hungary, the negative government rhetoric about NGOs intensified after the 
legislation was passed, with an uptick in the use of terms like “Soros-empire” and “mafia-like 
network” to describe NGOs and public statements that connect foreign funded NGOs with 
negative, often illegal activities such as “rescue[ing] criminals and terrorists” (Website of The 
Hungarian Government. 2017j). In Israel, the situation is similar: most recently, the government 
issued a statement that the activities of foreign-funded organizations harm the soldiers of the 
Israeli Defense Force (Harkov, 2017). Additionally, both the Hungarian and Israeli governments 
claimed before their national elections – in 2015 and in 2018, respectively, that foreign-funded 
NGOs tried to influence the election and attack the campaign of the governing parties by using 
millions of foreign funding. This type of accusation, without providing any evidence, could harm 
the public trust towards foreign-funded NGOs, civil society in general, and the government.  
Unfortunately, there is no public data available about whether the level of public trust 
has increased or not towards foreign-funded organizations, but it is likely that both 
governments used the stigmatization of NGOs as a tool to strengthen their political power and 
their raison d’être. As was discussed in Section 1, liberal autocracies often create a relatively 
liberal political climate for CSOs that provide social services or support the government’s 
interest, while foreign-funded and opposition NGOs are highly monitored at the same time 
(Albrecht, 2015, Brumberg, 2003) While both Hungary and Israel support and promote civil 
society, their foreign agents regulations stigmatize NGOs that could undermine their legitimacy 
and the public trust towards the sector, and even be used as a tool to heighten public fear and 
strengthen the power of the current governments. 
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5.3. Recommendations for finding the balance between national security and flourishing civil 
society 
As the study highlighted, both Hungary and Israel implemented the foreign agents 
regulations to protect their national security through transparency and accountability, however 
it is questionable whether the discussed regulations could meet those objectives.  While both 
countries face different external threats to their national security, it is possible that such 
regulations disproportionately attack foreign-funded NGOs regardless of their roles in society. 
In Hungary, the control of illegal migration remained one of the top priorities in the 
government agenda as several terrorist attacks occurred in Western Europe (Reuters, 2018) – 
even though the number of asylum-seekers has significantly dropped in the last 12 months 
(Eurostat, 2018). In Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict intensified in Spring 2018, after the U.S. 
government relocated their embassy to Jerusalem (Halbfinger et al., 2018). Thus, it seems that 
transparency and accountability is more important than ever to protect national security in 
these countries, but the legal tools need to be thoroughly designed and implemented to avoid 
undermining civil society both in Hungary and Israel. 
Thus, this study recommends the following options to achieve a balance between 
national security and the freedom if civil society, including the operation of foreign-funded 
NGOs: 
1) Coordination and collaboration with civil society, including foreign-funded NGOs  
Both governments have been criticized due to the lack of communication and 
coordination of foreign-funded NGOs. To plan and successfully implement any regulations, it is 
crucial to involve different actors, such as NGOs affected by the proposed regulations, members 
of the opposition parties, as well as the general public. Such coordination might clarify the 
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necessity of such regulations, lead to a consensus, and support the successful and effective 
implementation of the new policies.  
2) Harmonization of existing and proposed laws and regulations  
As the emphasis towards laws on illicit financial flows, anti-money laundering, and 
combating the financing of terrorism has increased in the 21th century, both Hungary and Israel 
have implemented regulations that enhance transparency and accountability and prevent 
money laundering and terrorism financing. Already there is evidence that such regulations can 
be harmful for CSOs (IUPUI Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2018), and special laws targeting 
foreign-funded NGOs might further undermine the roles and responsibilities of the sector. Thus, 
the thesis recommends harmonizing the existing regulations and if it is necessary, broadening 
the scope of illicit financial flow regulations rather than focusing legislation on labelling and 
therefore discriminate certain foreign-funded NGOs in the name of national security.  
3) Enhancement of transparency and accountability across the sector 
After analyzing the Hungarian and Israeli foreign agents regulations, there are several 
exemptions provided by law that might be, indeed, counterproductive to the goal of enhancing 
transparency and accountability in civil society, and may in fact pose a risk national security 
because the government does not monitor cross-border donations to these organizations. As a 
recommendation, the Hungarian regulation should include all CSOs, such as political parties, 
sport associations, religious and ethnic minority organizations, while the Israeli regulation 
should expand its scope to include organizations that receive cross-border donations from 
private entities. Such modifications can avoid unnecessary discrimination against certain types 
of foreign-funded NGOs and provide a more effective way to achieve the regulations’ goals 
regarding transparency and national security. 
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4) Use of neutral categories instead of discriminative labels 
Neither the Hungarian nor the Israeli legislation used the term “foreign agent”—instead, 
the governments used the terms “foreign-funded NGOs” or “organizations supported from 
abroad” respectively to refer pejoratively to organizations that receive funds from abroad. The 
continued negative connotations around these terms in each country mean that they are no 
longer neutral, and can be found discriminative. Thus, it is important to use neutral 
governmental communication during the discussion and implementation of any regulations 
affecting the sector in order to avoid possible stigmatization of foreign-funded NGOs. 
Furthermore, as such regulations aim to increase transparency and protect national security, the 
development of terminologies and categories should involve the main actors of the sector so 
that the sector and the government can both understand the advantages and necessity of using 
an agreed-upon term. 
5) Governmental support for more effective implementation 
Both the Hungarian and Israeli regulations provided a very short time period for foreign-
funded NGOs to implement the requirements – 8 days and less than 6 months, respectively. 
Additionally, the new regulations have established new administrative and reporting 
requirements for NGOs that – especially for smaller NGOs – make their operation and their 
compliance extremely difficult. Therefore, we also recommend adding an adequate time period 
so that CSOs can be fully prepared for the implementation of such regulations. Additionally, the 
government or government agencies might provide administrative support for smaller CSOs in 
order not to jeopardize their operation while complying with new reporting requirements that 
promote transparency and accountability. 
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6) Positive incentives and collaboration to promote transparency 
Finally, the thesis recommends using positive incentives to support transparency and 
accountability across the sector. Besides protecting national security, transparency could 
increase public trust towards CSOs and their activities. However, the current regulations offer 
extremely strong penalties in case of noncompliance that might negatively affect the level of 
public trust towards foreign-funded NGOs as well as the regulations’ public support itself. Thus, 
besides a more proportionate penalty in case of non-compliance, we recommend creating 
positive incentives and supporting self-regulatory initiatives to increase the sector’s 
transparency and accountability. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyzes the foreign agents regulations enacted in two developed 
democracies: in Hungary and Israel. As several studies mentioned (Anheier, 2017, Laufer 2017, 
Rutzen 2015, European Foundation Centre, 2017), the number of countries that have 
implemented foreign NGO laws might threaten the operation of civil society around the world. 
Interestingly, it is not only developing countries, but also some developed countries that have 
enacted foreign NGO laws to monitor and control the operation of foreign-funded NGOs. As the 
emphasis towards laws on illicit financial flows, anti-money laundering, and combating the 
financing of terrorism has increased in the 21th century, CSOs started to be seen as a possible 
vehicle for terrorist organizations as they had global presence with access to the population, 
they enjoyed high level of public trust, had access to considerable sources of funds, and, 
crucially, were not subject of general governmental oversight (Financial Action Task Force, 2010, 
2014). Thus, legislation on illicit financial flows started to indirectly discriminate against foreign-
funded NGOs both in developing and some developed countries. 
However, civil society and international NGOs have more important roles than ever. The 
new challenges that have emerged are global, affecting several countries at the same time such 
as the current environmental and refugee crises, money laundering, or terrorism. The United 
Nations emphasizes the importance of cross-sectoral and international collaboration to 
successfully face these challenges. Indeed, the United Nations started to strengthen the 
engagement with civil society and promote its international role in implementing and 
monitoring the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (CIVICUS, 2017c). Additionally, the 
shrinking space of civil society might be an indicator for the shrinking space of democracies and 
democratic values, therefore, it is important to start a conversation among researchers, policy-
makers, practitioners, and the general public to find the balance of simultaneously protecting 
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our civil society and national and international security. And while one of the universal human 
rights is the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and associations (Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 20), more and more countries have introduced restrictive regulations and 
practices towards civil society, particularly towards foreign-funded NGOs and human rights 
organizations.  
The number of countries that passed foreign agents regulations has increased in the last 
decade. Most recently two OECD member states, Hungary and Israel, passed their own 
regulations. Both Israel and Hungary have a strong civil society that have had a crucial role in the 
countries’ economic and political development. Both countries are high-income countries with 
high level of human development. However, according to Freedom House (2018a) both 
countries suffered a decrease in civil liberties due to the enactment of foreign agents 
regulations. 
Both countries argued that the foreign agents regulation is necessary to increase the 
transparency and accountability of NGOs and protect the nations’ internal security and interests 
and claimed that they used the 1938 FARA as a baseline. However, after analyzing all three 
regulations, we can infer that the Hungarian and Israeli regulations mainly target foreign-funded 
NGOs, and their regulation is indirectly discriminative and disproportionate towards NGOs 
working on specific fields such as human rights and transparency. In terms of requirements, 
both the Foreign NGO Law in Hungary and the Transparency Law in Israel mainly follow the 
requirements set by the United States’ FARA. However, the Hungarian regulation does not 
require the representatives of NGOs to inform parliamentary committees regarding their special 
status in case of public hearings. Finally, none of the analyzed countries use the term “foreign 
agent” to label NGOs affected by the regulation, but the terms of “organization supported from 
abroad” and “organization supported by a foreign state entity” used in Hungary and Israel, 
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respectively, have already gained a negative connotation due to the intensive anti-NGO 
language used by the governments. 
While both governments supported the foreign agents regulations to improve 
transparency and as well as national security, based on the domestic and international criticism, 
they have rather stigmatized a small but important group of civil society organizations by 
threatening and labeling foreign-funded NGOs working on human rights, protection of 
democratic values, and government accountability. The Hungarian government stated that such 
regulations are crucial for the “fight against illegal migrants,” while the Israeli government 
believes that such regulation is an important part of the protection of national sovereignty and 
security, especially in light of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is important to acknowledge that 
both the refugee crisis and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts impact national security and therefore, it 
is important to be aware of how foreign-funded NGOs use their funding and resources. 
However, it is also important to find balance between national security and the freedom of civil 
society. One of the ways to find this balance might be including and collaborating with civil 
society in order to develop a more balanced legal environment for foreign-funded NGOS and 
CSOs as well. Additionally, governments should seek to use neutral labels and practice less 
biased communication regarding foreign-funded NGOs. It may increase the credibility and 
necessity of such regulations while avoid the possible perception and interpretation of these 
policies as tools to strengthen the current governments’ position and intensify the importance 
of their own agenda. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the newly enacted foreign agents regulations in 
countries such as Hungary and Israel serve more as a political tool to strengthen the 
governments’ nationalistic ideology and power than as a tool to increase transparency in the 
nonprofit sector. As a consequence, the spread of foreign agents regulations could be an 
99 
indicator not only of the shrinking space of civil society, but also of the endangerment of 
Western democracies more broadly. Democracies seem to be more fragile than expected, and 
the excessive regulation of foreign-funded organizations could lead to weakening democracies.   
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EPILOGUE 
This study focuses on foreign agents regulations that were enacted in Hungary (2017) 
and Israel (2016). As discussed, foreign agents regulation may lead to better transparency, 
which is especially important at this time due to the rise of money laundering and terrorist 
activities. However, both the Hungarian and Israeli regulations label and stigmatize foreign-
funded NGOs – especially those that are against the government policies – rather than promote 
transparency in the sector or fight against money laundering, terrorism, or other national 
security threats. 
While the number of first asylum applicants has decreased significantly since 2016 
(Eurostat, 2018), more and more EU member states – such as Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Sweden, and most recently Italy – have implemented new regulations to increase 
border control and prevent arrivals of immigrants in their countries (European Commission, 
2018a, Borrelli, 2018). As the study states, while the immigration crisis is one of the biggest 
challenges to solve, the increasing level of populism and xenophobia in Europe might lead to 
implementing policies that would jeopardize human rights and the rule of law in European 
democracies. As an example, the Hungarian government enacted the “Stop-Soros legislative 
package” in June 2018 to support Hungarian sovereignty and national security by preventing 
Hungary from becoming a “country of immigrants” (Website of The Hungarian Government, 
2018a). The Hungarian government named the legislative package as “Stop Soros,” as Prime 
Minister Orban believes that George Soros has supported and campaigned for mass immigration 
in order to undermine the stability of Europe as well as to make financial profits (Website of The 
Hungarian Government, 2018b). Therefore, even the name of the legislation itself seems to 
stigmatize organizations working with immigrants. 
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According to Prime Minister Orban, the questions of immigration and the so-called 
Soros-plan were two of the most important issues in the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary election 
held on April 8, 2018. After the Fidesz-KDNP coalition won with absolute majority, Prime 
Minister Orban said that “the ‘Stop Soros’ legislative package and the draft amendment to the 
Constitution would be submitted to Parliament as soon as the new Hungarian government is 
formed” (Website of The Hungarian Government, 2018c). The legislative package (Act VI of 2018 
on amending certain laws related to measures to combat illegal immigration) amended several 
laws and regulations to criminalize any individual or organizational activities that support or 
promote illegal immigration, including assisting asylum-seekers or providing financial means for 
such activities. Additionally, in July 2018, the Hungarian Parliament also passed the 
amendments of the Tax Law that introduced a 25-percent special tax on aid groups that support 
migration (Act XLI of 2018 on amending certain tax laws and other related laws and the special 
tax on immigration).  
Such regulations not only seem to make human rights organizations’ work impossible, 
but also raise questions about whether Hungary’s actions are in accordance with international 
and European laws. The European Commission has referred Hungary to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union for non-compliance of its asylum and return legislation with EU law 
(European Commission, 2018b). Simultaneously, the Hungarian government announced that 
“there is no choice but to leave the migration pact proposed by the United Nations” as the 
proposed pact seems to be “an invitation” for migrants (Website of The Hungarian Government, 
2018d). 
It is far too soon to evaluate the recent “Stop-Soros” legislative package and the recent 
governmental campaigns against NGOs supporting immigration, but it is important to carefully 
monitor the Hungarian case – as well as the cases emerging in other developed countries  –  in 
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order to further analyze the possible outcomes of foreign agents regulations and other laws that 
might undermine cross-border philanthropy instead of combating money-laundering, terrorism, 
or other threats against national security. 
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